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Foreign Direct Investment from China:  
Sense and Sensibility 
 
By Angela Huyue Zhang* 
 
Abstract: Inspired by psychological studies on human judgment, this Article  
represents the first attempt to provide a systematic account of how various heuristics 
and cognitive biases can influence public perception as well as regulatory response to 
foreign direct investment.  In particular, it catalogues the main social and cognitive 
mechanisms through which various well-organized interest groups can exploit public 
fear of foreign direct investment from China.  By closely studying two examples—the 
U.S. Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of Unocal and the 
European Commission’s increased antitrust scrutiny of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises’ acquisitions in Europe—this Article shows how undue fear of Chinese 
investment can lead to counterproductive regulatory response.  Contrary to the 
popular perception that Chinese state-owned enterprises are mere puppets of the 
government, this Article draws attention to the pervasive but neglected agency 
problems that have powered the surge of Chinese outward investment.  It calls for 
more effortful thinking by Western policymakers and cautions against extreme 
precautionary measures for investment from China.  At the same time, however, it 
questions the wisdom of overseas investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises.  
Empire building incentives, exacerbated by weak corporate governance structures 
and the lack of financial disclosure, make it highly likely that state assets are 
squandered in overseas acquisitions. 
  
 
* J.S.D. (2011), J.D. (2008), and LL.M (2006), University of Chicago; Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in 
Law, King’s College London.  I am grateful for insightful comments from Judge Posner, Song Alex 
Yang, Wouter Wils, Daniel Sokol, Alberto Alemanno, Wentong Zheng, Christopher Townley, Alison 
Jones, Scott Kennedy, Thilo Hanemann, Yee Wah Chin, Sophie Meunier, Tabitha Mallory, Yujia Jiang, 
Yasheng Huang, and Paul Slovic.  I also thank participants at the law faculty workshop at King’s 
College London, and at the “Owned by China: Economic, Political, and Security Risks and 
Opportunities of Chinese Direct Investment in the World” conference at Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International Affairs at Princeton University for their helpful comments.  I welcome 
comments and criticism.  Email: angela.zhang@kcl.ac.uk. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The meteoric rise of China has astonished the world.  By any standard, 
China’s economic performance over the past three decades has been 
impressive.  Gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at an average of ten 
percent each year and hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out 
of poverty.1  China is now the largest manufacturer, the largest exporter, 
and the second largest economy in the world.2  Even if China grows a third 
as slowly in the future compared with its past, economists estimate that it 
will still surpass the United States in economic size by 2030.3  In 2012, 
China boasted seventy-three companies on the Fortune 500 list, surpassing 
 
1 See WORLD BANK, CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE HIGH-
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Japan in number of multinational companies; it now ranks second on the 
global list, immediately behind the United States.4 
While the West has described China as a “rising power,” China sees 
itself as a “returning power.”5  As Henry Kissinger acutely observes, from 
the perspective of the Chinese, “[T]he prospect of a powerful China 
exercising influence in economic, cultural, political and military affairs” is 
only “a return to the normal state of affairs.”6  Indeed, China was one of the 
most advanced and powerful countries in the world before the modern era, 
but its influence declined precipitately with the ascendency of the West 
during the Industrial Revolution.7  It is thus no surprise that the new 
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is now trumpeting a “great renaissance of the 
Chinese nation” to appeal to popular nationalistic sentiments.8 
But this is not the way the West sees China.  Indeed, the rise of China 
has inspired a mix of awe, fear, and skepticism.  As observed by China 
expert Peter Nolan: “The over-riding sentiment in both Europe and the 
USA is fear.”9  The fear of China is pervasive and comprehensive: there is 
fear of its growing military clout, 10  fear of Chinese espionage and 
penetration, 11  fear that its trade dominance will weaken domestic 
manufacturing sectors and cause widespread unemployment,12 fear of the 
secretive Chinese communist party,13 fear of poor enforcement of product 
quality and safety standards for Chinese products,14 and fear of the lack of 
protection for intellectual property rights.15  The list goes on.  
 
4 Global 500, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
5 HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 546 (2012). 
6 Id. 
7 JUSTIN YIFU LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY 1 (2012). 
8 Jane Cai & Verna Yu, Xi Jinping Outlines His Vision of ‘Dream and Renaissance,’ S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1193273/xi-jinping-outlines-
his-vision-chinas-dream-and-renaissance. 
9 PETER NOLAN, IS CHINA BUYING THE WORLD? 3 (2012). 
10 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND 
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013 (2013), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf. 
11 See, e.g., STEVE DEWEESE ET AL., CAPABILITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO 
CONDUCT CYBER WARFARE AND COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION (2009); see also OFFICE OF THE 
NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US ECONOMIC SECRETS IN 
CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE, 2009–2011 (2011). 
12 See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON. POLICY INST., THE CHINA TOLL (2012), available at 
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp345-china-growing-trade-deficit-cost/. 
13 See, e.g., RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST 
RULERS (1st ed. 2010). 
14 See, e.g., U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF 
INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTS FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR (2011). 
15 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS 
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Yet one of the biggest fears about China that has emerged in recent 
years is one of being “owned by China.”16  Since the financial crisis in 
2008, the growing prowess of Chinese firms and their rapid expansion in 
mature markets has inflamed global fears that China is “taking over” the 
world.  Such fear is amplified by the fact that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) 17  from China is dominated by state-owned or state-controlled 
enterprises (SOEs).18   As Chinese SOEs are often perceived as mere 
puppets of their state master, speculation about the political motives of 
Chinese outward investment abounds.  Accordingly, Western regulators are 
becoming increasingly concerned that Chinese investment constitutes a 
disruptive force in host economies.19 
But the controversy about Chinese FDI hardly marks the first time that 
anxiety and opposition have been directed toward a foreign nation’s 
investment activity.  Indeed, FDI has been controversial from the start.  
Economists have debated its costs and benefits to host countries, politicians 
have wrangled over the economic and national security implications of 
foreign powers controlling domestic economies, and lawmakers have 
disagreed on how to optimally regulate FDI.  While the literature on FDI is 
voluminous, this Article represents the first attempt to apply psychology in 
order to provide a systematic account of how various heuristics and 
cognitive biases can influence public perception as well as regulatory 
responses to FDI.  It first traces the sources of undue fear of FDI and 
 
INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 
(2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf. 
16 NOLAN, supra note 9, at 10. 
17 The concept of FDI is elusive.  Traditionally it has been defined as the “ownership of assets in 
one country by residents of another for purposes of controlling the use of those assets.”  See EDWARD 
M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (3rd ed. 
1995).  In practice, however, the nationality of a firm is difficult to identify and the concept of what 
constitutes “control” is controversial.  See id. at 8–10.  For the purposes of this Article, FDI from China 
is defined generally as outward investment made by companies residing in China (excluding wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises) and their overseas subsidiaries.  These Chinese investments can take the 
form of greenfield investment or acquisitions of more than 10% ownership interest in existing foreign 
companies.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
18 According to the official data by Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), SOEs accounted 
for more than 55% of total Chinese outward investment in the non-financial sector in 2011.  See 
MOFCOM, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA & STATE ADMIN. OF 
FOREIGN EXCH., 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
11 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI]. 
19 See, e.g., ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS 
OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 118 (2012), available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/Research/11-7-12_An_Analysis_of_Chinese_Investments_in_the_U.S._Economy(CTI).pdf 
(“These entities [SOEs] are potentially disruptive because they frequently respond to policies of the 
Chinese government, which is the ultimate beneficial owner of U.S. affiliates of China’s SOEs.  
Likewise, the government behaves like an owner, providing overall direction to SOE investments, 
including encouragement on where to invest, in which industries, and to what ends.”). 
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explores people’s difficulties in assessing its risks, and then connects those 
difficulties to FDI regulations. 
This methodology is by no means country specific.  However, Chinese 
FDI provides a particularly intriguing context to study how heuristics and 
cognitive biases can lead to irrational policy response.  For the past 
century, FDI has flowed almost exclusively from developed countries to 
developing countries.  The influx of Chinese FDI to the Western world 
represents the first reversal of such a trend, a new phenomenon that neither 
the Western public nor regulators are familiar with.  Unfamiliarity also 
entails much uncertainty as to the nature of the potential harm of Chinese 
investment and the likelihood of such harm occurring.  When information 
is scarce, there is a tendency for people to rely on their intuition to make 
judgments.  But overreliance on intuition can lead people astray in forming 
misconceived judgments.20 
This Article does not argue that none of the fears about Chinese FDI 
are justified or that all Western response to Chinese FDI is irrational.  In 
fact, it is perfectly rational for the Western public and regulators to have 
doubts about Chinese FDI.  Even after several rounds of privatization 
reform, the Chinese government still retains a significant interest in a large 
portion of the Chinese economy.  According to the latest estimate from a 
U.S. congressional report, SOEs account for more than 40% of China’s 
non-agricultural GDP.21  Although many of these Chinese SOEs have 
adopted a modern corporate governance structure and are listed on 
domestic and international stock exchanges, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) continues to exercise control over the appointments of their 
leadership.22  The political control over personnel, coupled with opaque 
governance structures (especially at the holding company level, where 
corporations are wholly owned by the government and thus not subject to 
public listing rules), cast a long shadow over the independence of Chinese 
SOEs.23  Moreover, the Chinese government’s recent campaign to actively 
encourage its domestic companies to “go global” further invites suspicion 
about the motivations of those Chinese SOEs pursuing overseas 
investment.24 
 
20 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 49 (2004) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON]. 
21 See ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI & COLE KYLE, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, AN 
ANALYSIS OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND STATE CAPITALISM IN CHINA (2011). 
22 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 737 (2013); see also Hon S. Chan, 
Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998, 179 CHINA Q. 703 (2004). 
23 See Angela Huyue Zhang, The Single-Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb for Chinese State-
Owned Enterprises?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 805, 815 (2012). 
24 In a recent speech to Chinese diplomats, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stated the following: 
“We should hasten the implementation of our ‘going-out’ strategy and combine the utilization of 
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But what skeptics often fail to realize is that no FDI is free of risk—
any investment from foreign countries can pose potential political and 
economic risks to the host country.  The crucial task is not only the 
identification of the possible risks, but also the evaluation of the magnitude 
of such risks and the likelihood that such risks will materialize.  Regulators 
must consider both the benefits that Chinese FDI could bring and the 
potential costs of blocking such investment.  Unfortunately, intuitive and 
emotional responses often trump careful cost and benefit analysis during 
policy debates.  For Western regulators to make informed decisions about 
Chinese FDI, it is extremely important that they consider the typical 
scenarios where people overreact to Chinese FDI, as well as circumstances 
where undue fear of Chinese FDI is exploited by various social forces that 
ultimately lead to ineffective or even counterproductive regulatory 
responses. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II identifies anomalies in 
perception about FDI and explores how various heuristics and biases can 
lead to undue fear of investment from China.  Part III describes the social 
mechanisms through which various well-organized interest groups can 
promote, amplify, and exploit public fear of Chinese FDI to advance their 
own agendas.  Part IV surveys FDI regulations in both the United States 
and Europe and explores how irrational thinking about Chinese FDI can 
lead to a counterproductive regulatory response.  This part focuses on two 
representative examples: the U.S. Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s 
attempted acquisition of Unocal in 2005 and the recent European 
Commission’s (the Commission) increased antitrust scrutiny of Chinese 
SOEs’ acquisitions in Europe.  Part V studies how agency problems at 
Chinese SOEs—which tend to be neglected or even ignored by Western 
regulators—have powered the surge of Chinese FDI.  Part VI concludes 
with policy implications and final thoughts. 
 
II.  COGNITIVE BIAS, EMOTION, AND FDI 
 
This Article was inspired by the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, two leading psychologists on human judgment.  In 1974, 
Kahneman and Tversky published a path-breaking article in Science 
Magazine entitled Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.25  
 
foreign exchange reserves with the ‘going out’ of our enterprises.”  See Jamil Anderlini, China to 
Deploy Foreign Reserves, FIN. TIMES (July 21, 2009, 7:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b576ec86-
761e-11de-9e59-00144feabdc0.html; see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., State Owned 
Enterprise in China: Reviewing the Evidence (Occasional Paper, Jan. 26, 2009) (noting that the main 
goals of the “go global” strategy include enlarging global markets, exploiting natural resources abroad, 
attaining higher technologies, and enhancing the corporate brand values of Chinese enterprises). 
25 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
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Their article shows that people often make decisions on the basis of 
heuristic devices (the simplifying shortcuts of intuitive thinking), which 
may work well in many circumstances but can also lead to systematic 
errors.  The article was an instant success and has inspired scholars in many 
fields, including finance, law, statistics, and philosophy.  Indeed, the past 
decade has seen increasing enthusiasm for the behavioral analysis of law in 
the United States.26  One of the leading thinkers in this field is Cass 
Sunstein, who has made significant contributions in applying studies on 
heuristics and biases to the analysis of risk, regulation, and public policy.27  
Sunstein believes that biased reactions to risks are an important source of 
erratic and misplaced priorities in public policy. 28   In particular, he 
introduces a general framework for thinking about the precautionary 
measures adopted by regulators in reaction to irrational responses to risks.29  
He argues that such a framework is necessary as regulators can be prone to 
the same cognitive biases that affect wider publics, and because they may 
want to exploit public fear to advance political agendas.30   Although 
Sunstein’s work focuses on environmental, food, and security regulation, a 
similar framework of analysis can be applied to the study of FDI regulation 
and public policy.  The fundamental task of FDI regulation for any country 
is to decide how to deal with the risks posed by FDI—essentially a matter 
of judgment under uncertainties. 
Building on a vast body of literature on psychology, law, political 
science, and economics, this Article explores the underlying dynamics of 
fear of FDI.  From time to time the rapid rise of FDI hits a nerve in host 
countries, triggering fear that foreign countries are taking over the 
economy.  But too often, the public panic about the threat of FDI is based 
on rapid intuitive thinking, guided directly by people’s impressions and 
feelings.  This can lead them to form misconceived judgments about FDI.  
Moreover, when people are fearful of FDI, governments are likely to 
respond by tightening regulations.  Furthermore, regulators themselves can 
also resort to intuitive thinking and overreact to FDI, especially when they 
 
SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
26 See, e.g., Christine M. Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein 
ed., 2000); CHRISTINE M. JOLLS, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (2010); see also Joshua D. 
Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and 
Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1054 (2012).  The authors compiled statistics 
documenting this phenomenon of increased legal academic interest in behavioral law and economics.  Id. 
27 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS]; SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20. 
28 See generally SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 13–106. 
29 Id. at 109–48. 
30 Id. 
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are confronted with a novel situation where the risks of FDI are difficult to 
assess.  What the public and regulators often fail to realize, however, is that 
regulation can come at a dear cost, and can itself pose risks to economic 
health and national security.  To avoid the self-defeating tendencies of 
undue fear, it is extremely important to identify how people’s thinking 
about FDI can go wrong and how such errors can lead to ineffective and 
even counterproductive law and policy. 
 
A.  Dual Process of Mind 
 
Abundant research in psychology has identified the existence of a dual 
process of mind.31  Referring to processes similar to those traditionally 
called “intuition” and “reason,” psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard 
West label them as “System 1” and “System 2,” respectively.32  System 1 is 
rapid, automatic, and intuitive; it operates quickly and without much effort 
at self-control.33  It is thus often prone to error.34  System 2 is slow, 
deliberative, and calculative; it allocates attention to the effortful mental 
activities that demand it and is less prone to errors.35  While System 1 
proposes quick answers to problems of judgment, System 2 operates as a 
monitor that confirms or overrides those judgments.36 
According to Kahneman, the core of System 1 thinking lies in 
associative memory, which continually constructs a coherent interpretation 
of the things that happen in our world.37  Therefore, System 1 can operate 
as an associative machine—one that allows people to jump to conclusions.  
Kahneman’s formula for this phenomenon is “what you see is all there 
is.”38  Moreover, because people are more sensitive to the strength of 
evidence than its weight, confidence is often determined by the coherence 
of the story rather than the quality or quantity of the evidence.39  As such, 
people are far too willing to believe findings based on inadequate evidence 
 
31 See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of 
Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752 (1980); Daniel 
Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representatives Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, 
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich, 
Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
32 Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the 
Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 645, 658–59 (2000). 
33 Id. at 658. 
34 Id. at 659. 
35 See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 68. 
36 See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 31. 
37 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13 (2011). 
38 Id. at 86. 
39 See generally Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of 
Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992). 
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and are prone to collect too few observations in making decisions.  
Furthermore, people tend to seek data and analyses that are likely to be 
compatible with their intuitive thinking and beliefs, which can contribute to 
confirmation basis.40  This contrasts with System 2 thinking, which is in 
charge of doubting and disbelieving.41 
One salient manifestation of System 1 thinking is the difficulty people 
have with statistical thought.  People tend to solve inductive problems by 
the use of a variety of intuitive heuristics.  Statistics, however, require 
people to make summary judgments of complex information.  Accordingly, 
they tend to make errors when these heuristics diverge from the correct 
statistical approach.42  In the context of FDI, public alarm is often caused 
by the impression of a sudden surge of foreign capital flowing into the 
domestic economy.43  Such impressions are mostly formed on the basis of 
widespread media reports, particularly those reports that cite vivid 
examples of high-profile foreign takeovers and that warn of the dire 
consequences of a takeover of the domestic economy by foreign 
companies.  System 1 thinking can thus operate as a mechanism for people 
to jump to the conclusion that FDI poses a threat to the host economy.  
Indeed, few would go the extra mile to conduct a statistical study in order 
to get the full picture of the FDI phenomenon.  Such impulsive thinking 
dominated the American public perception of Japanese FDI three decades 
ago. 
In the 1980s, a sudden surge of FDI into the United States was the 
subject of concern in Congress, the media, and academic circles.  The 
public debate targeted Japan, which was accused of seeking global 
dominance.  Japanese purchases of iconic American companies and luxury 
real estate, such as Columbia Pictures, the Empire State Building, 
Rockefeller Centre, and Pebble Beach Golf Course generated sensational 
headlines and evoked economic, socio-cultural, and political fears among 
the American public and regulators.44  Americans began to fear that the 
Japanese were “taking over” the U.S. economy.45  According to a 1988 
public opinion survey conducted by the polling firm of Smick-Medley and 
 
40 KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 81. 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 
3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of 
Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A 
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
43 EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 95 (2006). 
44 Wei He & Marjorie A. Lyles, China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 51 BUS. HORIZON 
485, 486 (2008). 
45 C.S. Eliot Kang, U.S. Politics and Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, 51 
INT’L ORG. 301, 317 (1997). 
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Associates, 73% of respondents believed the Japanese invested the most in 
the United States, while only 3% believed the British did.46  This fear of 
Japanese expansion into the United States was epitomized by public furor 
against Fujitsu’s 1986 bid for Fairchild Semiconductor, a leading American 
computer chip firm.  U.S. regulators viewed this acquisition as an attempt 
by Japanese companies to dominate the world semiconductor market, 
which would not only affect U.S. market share in the semiconductor 
industry, but also affect national security. 47   Confronted with the 
overwhelming negative political response, Fujitsu decided to withdraw its 
bid. 
But these common perceptions about Japanese investment in the 
United States were not borne out by data.  During this period, the United 
Kingdom was the top investor whereas Japan only ranked third in terms of 
assets invested in the United States. 48   Second, the growing foreign 
investment into the United States was not primarily a U.S.–Japan issue.  
According to leading FDI experts Edward Graham and Paul Krugman, 
Japanese firms accounted for only a small fraction of both the level of 
foreign presence and its growth in the United States (except for the banking 
sector), even though they had increased considerably in relative 
importance.49  In fact, various data sources indicate that foreign investment 
(including that from Japan) in U.S. real estate was very tiny.50 
Importantly, few realized that the increased foreign presence in the 
United States, including the increased FDI from Japan, was only part of a 
globalization trend rather than a phenomenon unique to the United States.51  
From 1985 to 1990, FDI in the United States grew from approximately 
$185 billion to $395 billion, representing an annual growth rate of 16%.52  
While this seems to be a massive increase, the total worldwide inward FDI 
stock also grew from $972.2 billion to $1,950.3 billion, representing an 
annual growth rate of 15%, closely similar to the growth rate of the United 
 
46 NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P. WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS: HOW FOREIGN 
INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY 32 (1989) (citing Smick-Medley & Assoc., Foreign 
Investment: A Smick-Medley and Associates Public Opinion Survey of U.S. Attitudes 12 (Smick-Medley 
White Paper, 1988)). 
47 Barry K. Robinson, Practical Comments on the Exon-Florio Provisions and Proposed 
Regulations, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 173, 182 (1989); see also Paul I. Djurisic, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: National 
Security Legislation Hampered by Political and Economic Forces, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 179, 184 (1990). 
48 See GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 46, at 35. 
49 GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 22–23. 
50 Id. at 31. 
51 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 22–23. 
52 TDBOR, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Toward Services, Annex tbl.B.3, UNCTAD/ 
WIR/2004 (2004). 
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States.53  Indeed, foreign-controlled firms had already played a significant 
role in many other advanced countries, such as the United Kingdom and 
France in the 1980s, and, therefore, much of the rise of inward FDI in the 
United States could be viewed as a shift to the more typical position of 
these developed countries.54  According to the 1993 UN World Investment 
Report, from 1986 to 1991, the United States ranked only tenth out of 
twenty-three industrialized countries in average FDI inflows as a share of 
GDP.55  Unfortunately, this fact was largely missed during the policy 
debate on Japanese FDI.56  As the level of Japanese direct investment 
reached record highs in the late 1980s, members of Congress remade the 
long dormant rules and regulations targeting foreign acquisitions, 
ultimately leading to the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendments of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Exon-Florio), a piece of 
legislation that has had far reaching implications for FDI regulations in the 
United States.57 
The current hot debate over Chinese FDI could be “a case of déjà vu 
for the United States.”58  Indeed, the political backdrop against which 
Chinese FDI takes place today also bears striking similarity to that of 
Japanese FDI three decades ago—rising trade friction, continuing dispute 
over currency manipulation, heated debates over state subsidies, and 
perceptions of China’s increasing economic rise and the West’s relative 
decline.59  Today media reports on Chinese FDI have mostly focused on its 
rapid growth, as evidenced by recent examples of Chinese companies 
snapping up well-known international brands such as IBM, Volvo, Chateau 
de Viaud vineyard, Ferretti luxury yachts, and AMC Theatres.  These 
transactions make sensational headlines, as it is only a very recent 
phenomenon that companies from emerging countries such as China have 
started to venture overseas to make acquisitions in advanced countries.  
The avalanche of such news reports could therefore provoke worries that 
 
53 Id. 
54 See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 32–33. 
55 See TDBOR, World Investment Report 1993: Transnational Corporations and Integrated International 
Production, Annex tbl.3 (1993). 
56 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 22. 
57 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 502, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). 
58 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Chinese Investment: A Case of Déjà Vu for the United States, 4 E. ASIAN F.Q. 
1, 34 (2012). 
59 See, e.g., Sophie Meunier, Political Impact of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the 
European Union on Transatlantic Relations 5 (European Parliament Briefing Paper, May 4, 2012); see 
also Curtis Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from Japan in the 1980s, in 
INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A REFERENCE SERIES FOR CHINESE INVESTORS 2 (2008).  To be 
sure, Chinese FDI also has important features that can be distinguished from Japanese FDI.  See infra 
Part IV. 
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Chinese firms are buying up the world.60 
But such concerns are exaggerated.  To be sure, Chinese FDI has been 
increasing rapidly.  Since China officially announced the “Go Global” 
policy in 2000, FDI outflows jumped from a mere $1 billion in 2000 to 
more than $74 billion in 2011, representing an average compound growth 
rate of almost 50% annually.61  But the base of China’s FDI is very small.  
The most recent official figures show that in 2011 China’s FDI stock 
accounts for just $425 billion—a mere 2% of the global total.62  While 
China had the sixth largest FDI outflows in 2011, it ranked thirteenth in 
terms of FDI stock.63  In comparison, Japan’s FDI stock was more than 
twice that of China’s, while the United States held more than ten times that 
of China.64  Indeed, Chinese outward investment as a percentage of overall 
GDP is much lower than most developed countries.  In 2011, China’s 
outward FDI stock to GDP ratio was only 6%, far below the global average 
of 31% and the transitional economy average of 17%.65  China’s FDI stock 
in both the United States and Europe remains trivial compared to the 
aggregate.  Based on statistics from China’s Ministry of Commerce and the 
United Nations, in 2011 FDI inflows from China accounted for only 0.8% 
of the total FDI inflows into the United States and less than 2% in 
Europe.66  The weight of total Chinese FDI stock in these economies is 
even more trivial, accounting for approximately 0.3% of the total in both 
the United States and Europe in 2011.67 
But even these figures can be deceiving, as the absolute number of 
Chinese FDI flows is only a very crude estimate.  The vast majority of 
Chinese FDI goes to offshore tax havens.  For instance, the top three 
destinations for Chinese FDI flows in 2011 were Hong Kong, the British 
Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands.68  In particular, Hong Kong alone 
accounted for 53% of Chinese total outward investment flows.  The top 
 
60 See, e.g., FRANÇOIS GODEMENT, JONAS PARELLO-PLESNER & ALICE RICHARD, EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE SCRAMBLE FOR EUROPE (2011) (“China is buying up Europe.  
Its automobile manufacturers have bought MG and Volvo and taken a life-saving stake in Saab.  Its 
transportation firms are acquiring, leasing or managing harbours, airports, and logistical and assembly 
bases across the continent.  Its development bank is financing projects in Europe’s periphery much like 
it does in Africa.”); see also various news reports about Chinese outbound acquisitions infra notes 137–38. 
61 See 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI, supra note 18, at 5. 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See TDBOR, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies, 
Annex tbl.7, http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=171.  
66 Id. Annex tbl.1.1; 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI, supra note 18, at 9–10. 
67 See TDBOR, supra note 65, Annex tbl.1.2; 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD 
FDI, supra note 18, at 15. 
68 See 2011 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI, supra note 18, at 9. 
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three destinations together accounted for 69% of the total, whereas only 
less than 3% of Chinese FDI went to the United States.69  Due to the 
inherent secrecy of these tax havens, the ultimate destinations of Chinese 
FDI flows are difficult to reveal.  These countries are gateways for FDI 
because they offer professional services and institutional support 
unavailable in China and can give Chinese investors the cover of another 
nationality.70  Some of these investments in fact reflect the phenomenon of 
“round-tripping,” whereby funds are moved abroad and then reinvested in 
China to benefit from the advantageous terms that the Chinese government 
provides for foreign investors.71  While some of the financial advantages 
provided by the Chinese government, such as favorable tax treatments, 
have been phased out in recent years, some advantages still remain in many 
circumstances.72  Therefore, if a large portion of Chinese FDI flows to 
Hong Kong is ultimately reinvested back into mainland China, then the 
absolute number of Chinese FDI flows probably overstates its true amount.  
On the other hand, if some of the funds invested in tax havens are 
redirected to other countries such as those in Europe or the United States, 
then the value of Chinese investment in those regions should be higher than 
the current figures suggest.  Recognizing the shortcomings of the official 
data, Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann from the Rhodium Group 
compiled their own dataset to monitor Chinese FDI.73  While their figures 
are higher than official data, they are still small by any standard.  For 
instance, they estimated that China’s outward investment would account 
for a mere 4% of total EU FDI inflows in 2010.74  Thus it seems that even 
if the Chinese FDI figures are adjusted upwards, it would still have a 
miniscule presence in Western countries. 
The above analysis illustrates the important role that statistics can play 
in informing FDI policy making, but unfortunately its importance is often 
overlooked during policy debate.  Instead, people rely on intuition and 
resort to various mental shortcuts when making judgments about FDI.  As 
discussed in detail below, various heuristics and biases could be the major 




70 See Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J. 
INT’L BUSINESS STUDIES 337, 339–40 (2008); see also Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wigg, What Determines 
Chinese Outward FDI, 47 J. WORLD BUSINESS 26, 28 (2012). 
71 Morck et al., supra note 70, at 340. 
72 DANIEL H. ROSEN & THILO HANEMANN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CHINA’S CHANGING 
OUTBOUND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROFILE: DRIVERS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 n.10 
(2009), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb09-14.pdf. 
73 THILO HANEMANN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, RHODIUM GRP., CHINA INVESTS IN EUROPE: PATTERNS, 
IMPACTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 35–36 (2012). 
74 Id. at 35. 
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B.  Loss Aversion 
 
People tend to be loss averse.75  They have the tendency to strongly 
prefer avoiding losses rather than accruing gains.  Consider the following 
experiment.  If you are offered a gamble where there is a 50% chance of 
winning $110 and 50% chance of losing $100, will you take this gamble?  
The rational response is yes, as the expected gain ($55) clearly exceeds the 
expected loss ($50).  However, like most people, you probably will choose 
not to play this game because the psychological cost of losing $100 
outweighs the benefit of winning $110.  It should be noted that loss 
aversion is a deeply ingrained human trait that can be traced to 
evolutionary history.76  Indeed, studies have found that organisms that treat 
threats as more urgent have a better chance to survive and reproduce.77 
Loss aversion has been applied to explain many anomalies in life.  
One particularly interesting phenomenon is the “endowment effect,” that is, 
the human tendency to demand more to give up a good than one would be 
willing to pay to acquire it.78  But the endowment effect is not universal.  
Merchants who trade goods for a living or financial traders who trade 
stocks as their daily business activities do not suffer from the endowment 
effect because they view their goods as carriers of value for future 
exchanges.79  Another implication of loss aversion is that individuals have a 
strong tendency to remain at the status quo, a phenomenon known as status 
quo bias.80  In addition, loss aversion can influence people’s judgment 
about fairness.  Studies show that people’s perception of fairness strongly 
depends on whether the question is framed as reduction in a gain or as a 
loss.81   
These psychological findings on loss aversion have important 
implications for the study of risk regulation.  Sunstein observed that people 
 
75 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and Assumptions of Economics, in QUASI 
RATIONAL ECONOMICS 137, 143 (1991); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1328 (1990). 
76 See Arne Ohman, Fear and Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena: Clinical Phenomenology, 
Evolutionary Perspectives, and Information-Processing Mechanisms, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 511, 
520 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 1993). 
77 Id. 
78 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent 
Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991); see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 
196 (1991). 
79 KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 294; see also John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate 
Market Anomaly?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41 (2003). 
80 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 78, at 196. 
81 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 731 (1986). 
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are closely attuned to losses produced by newly introduced risks or any 
aggravating risks, but are far less concerned with the benefits that are 
foregone as a result of regulation.82  In the context of FDI, loss aversion 
and the endowment effect could explain some anomalies in people’s 
thinking about the economic consequences of FDI.  All around the world, 
governments and national publics tend to be friendlier to greenfield 
investments than to foreign acquisitions. 83   For example, greenfield 
investors “are usually offered generous incentives” by local governments, 
but foreign takeovers are often viewed with skepticism and “are sometimes 
thwarted” for economic or political reasons, particularly when they involve 
“strategic” industries.84  For instance, a national survey conducted by the 
Pew Research Center in March 2006 found that 53% of Americans held a 
negative view of foreign investors “owning” U.S. companies (foreign 
acquisitions), whereas only 36% of Americans viewed foreign companies 
“investing” in the United States (greenfield investment) as bad.85 
From an economic standpoint, however, there seems to be little sense 
in distinguishing greenfield investment and investment via acquisitions.  In 
fact, economic theory on FDI usually does not distinguish between 
different modes of entry at all.86  Indeed, it has been generally recognized 
that the primary expected economic benefits of inward FDI are productivity 
gains—gains that can arise from either greenfield investments or 
acquisitions.87  For instance, Krugman and Graham argue that the main 
benefits of FDI in the United States—the facilitation of trade in goods, 
services, and knowledge—generally apply regardless of investors’ mode of 
entry; moreover, they argue that FDI only has an indirect and limited effect 
on aggregate employment and net trade in the United States.88  Empirical 
evidence also “suggests that the supposed advantages of greenfield 
investment over” foreign acquisitions—“such as net job creation and the 
building of export capacities—do not figure among the main benefits of 
FDI.”89 
 
82 SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 42. 
83 OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 68 (2007).  Generally speaking, Greenfield investment refers to a form of FDI where foreign 
investors establish new operational facilities from the ground up in the host country. 
84 Id. at 71. 
85 News Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Bush Approval Falls to 33%, 
Congress Earns Rare Praise 2 (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdf/271.pdf. 
86 See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 57–67. 
87 See Magnus Blomstrom, Ari Kokko & Mario Zejan, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: FIRM AND 
HOST COUNTRIES STRATEGIES 101–221 (2000); see also OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING COSTS 9 (2002). 
88 See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, note 17, at 59–65. 
89 See OECD, supra note 83, at 86. 
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So why do people tend to be more friendly to greenfield investment 
than to foreign acquisitions?  This in part may have to do with loss aversion 
and status quo bias.  Greenfield projects are new investments that are 
perceived to create job opportunities and, if the project generates exports, 
to have a potentially positive impact on the trade balance.  Thus there 
appears to be obvious “gain” from greenfield investment but no obvious 
“loss.”  In contrast, foreign takeovers of domestic assets mean the host 
country is ceding control of the domestic assets to foreign investors.  Host 
countries may be concerned that foreign acquisitions of domestic 
enterprises could lead to workforce reductions and increased 
unemployment.  There may also be concern that foreign acquisitions could 
lead to declining exports, as a parent company may decide that export 
markets could best be served by affiliates elsewhere.90  Other concerns 
include the loss of technological capabilities or loss of competitive 
advantages if technology is actually transferred out of the host economy.91  
People tend to fixate on the potential losses brought about by foreign 
acquisitions, without investigating whether such concerns are legitimate, 
whether the probable occurrence of such losses is high, or whether foreign 
acquisitions may actually benefit the host economy.  Indeed, these potential 
“costs” loom large in people’s minds, and their aversion to loss could 
therefore distort perception of the benefits of foreign takeovers, especially 
when a particular public understands itself to be “endowed” with the 
strategic assets of acquired firms.  As such, they tend to resort to mental 
shortcuts and jump to the conclusion that the cost of ceding control of 
domestic assets outweighs the benefits gained from foreign acquisitions. 
Endowment effects also affect people’s sense of fairness in terms of 
FDI regulation.  When people think they are endowed with their country’s 
strategic assets, they tend to believe that it is fair for regulators to introduce 
harsh measures to block foreigners from taking away those assets.  One 
good example is the French people’s overwhelming opposition to Pepsi’s 
attempted acquisition of Danone in 2005.92  Danone is a leading French 
food company and a source of enormous pride in France.  As a “national 
business champion,” Danone occupied a “special place in French hearts,” 
whereas PepsiCo was viewed as “the ugly face of American capitalism.”93  
The French people are so emotionally attached to Danone that no payoff 
from PepsiCo was deemed sufficient to compensate for the psychological 
cost of ceding control of a leading French business to an American firm.  
Although Pepsi ultimately denied its intention to acquire Danone, the case 
 
90 Id. at 85. 
91 Id. at 86. 
92 Franck Riboud, France Flouts the Pepsi Challenge, TELEGRAPH (July 24, 2005),  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2919479/France-flouts-the-Pepsi-challenge.html. 
93 Id. 
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prompted the French government to take preemptive action to introduce 
laws protecting companies in strategic industries such as Danone.94 
 
C.  Availability Heuristic 
 
The “availability heuristics” refers to the process through which 
people judge the frequency of an event by the ease with which instances 
can be brought to mind.95  If a salient event is highly publicized by the 
media, people tend to think an event is more probable as they can recall an 
occurrence more easily.  For instance, immediately after the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, many people were scared of flying and 
chose to drive instead without being aware that driving is a more dangerous 
form of transportation.96  On the other hand, when the risks are not easily 
accessible and available, people tend to ignore them.97  As psychologist 
Paul Slovic asserts: “What is out of sight is effectively out of mind.”98  
Availability heuristics do not exist in a social vacuum, as suggested by Tim 
Kuran and Cass Sunstein, who have studied the social mechanisms that 
govern the availability of information.99  They observe that availability 
heuristics interact with social processes, particularly informational and 
reputational forces.  According to the authors, when people communicate 
their opinions to others, it creates an information externality.  Thus, an 
availability cascade is formed whenever individual uses of the availability 
heuristic increase public availability of data pointing to a particular 
interpretation or conclusion, and this increase in availability then triggers 
reinforcing individual response.100 
In the context of FDI, public sentiment regarding foreign investment 
could also be swayed by availability heuristics.  Consider a dramatic 
incident such as the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 
2001.  Commentators observed that this event fundamentally changed the 
perception of FDI held by many U.S. policymakers, many of whom have 
called for greater consideration of the impact of FDI on national security.101  
Congress’ fierce opposition to the attempted takeover by Dubai Customs 
 
94 Inst. for Econ. & Soc. Research, New Legislation Aimed at Regulating Takeover Bids, EIRONLINE 
(Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/04/articles/fr0604039i.htm. 
95 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 25, at 1127. 
96 Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of the White House 
Commission’s Recommendations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 791, 804 (1997). 
97 See generally Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Mark Layman & Barbara Combs, 
Judged Frequency of Lethal Events: Human Learning and Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 551 (1978). 
98 See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 107–09 (2000). 
99 Timur Kuran & Cass Sustein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
100 Id. at 712. 
101 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS (2013). 
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and Free Zone Corporation (Dubai Ports World) is a case in point.  In 2006, 
Dubai Ports World, a company based in United Arab Emirate (UAE), 
proposed to purchase the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company (P&O), a London-based company.  P&O operates a number of 
facilities worldwide including six ports in the United States.  In January 
2006, President Bush approved the transaction after Dubai Ports World 
provided an assurance letter providing guarantees for certain security 
standards to be met at the U.S. ports.102  However, because Dubai Ports 
World is an investor based in a Middle Eastern nation, the deal attracted 
overwhelmingly negative media attention and spurred impassioned debates 
over the national security implications of allowing a Middle Eastern 
company to assume control over important U.S. port facilities. 103  
Americans’ fresh memories of the tragedies of September 11, a component 
of the associative machine of System 1, dominated public judgment about 
the transaction.  Undue fears were propounded by gripping news headlines 
such as “Dubai Ports Company in Al-Qaida Heartland.”104  The UAE was 
depicted in the media as an “operational and financial base for the hijackers 
who carried out the attacks of Sep. 11, 2001.”105 
But the public debate about the risks posed by the Dubai Ports World 
transaction was marked by great exaggeration.  First of all, the UAE has 
been an ally and friend of the United States post-September 11.106  Second, 
it is the U.S. Coast Guard and customs authorities, not the port operators, 
who are ultimately responsible for port security.107  Importantly, Dubai 
Ports World had already given assurance that it would meet certain security 
standards to address U.S. concern about national security risks. 108  
Unfortunately, U.S. politicians did not emphasize these facts.  Instead they 
pointed to the “worst-case scenario,” suggesting that there could be dire 
consequences of UAE control of U.S. ports. 109   Indeed, for many 
Americans, the idea of terrorists conjures up intense images of disaster and 
suffering.  Even if the risks were really remote, Americans’ extreme 
repulsion to terrorism after September 11 made it impossible for them to 
 
102 Press Release, Dep’t of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security in the 
Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006). 
103 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (2014). 
104 Stellar Dendrite, Peter King: Dubai Ports Company in “Al-Qaida Heartland,” NEWSMAX.COM 
(Feb. 20, 2006), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1582224/posts. 
105 Associated Press, More Objections to Port Takeover By Arab Entity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, 
at A9. 
106 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 139. 
107 David D. Kirkpatrick & Patrick McGeehan, Pataki Joins Opposition to Takeover of Ports, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at B3. 
108 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 138. 
109 Id. at 140. 
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tolerate any risk posed by an acquisition by a Middle Eastern company. 
Availability heuristics could similarly affect American attitudes 
toward Chinese FDI today.  For instance, the row against espionage 
activities conducted by the Chinese government recently intensified in the 
United States.  In February 2013, Mandiant, a private security firm, 
released a report that documents systematic cyber attacks originating from 
a building in Shanghai.110  The Chinese military is suspected to be involved 
in this attack, although there is no conclusive evidence to prove this.  The 
incident has received heightened attention from the U.S. government.  In 
response to mounting anger over Chinese cyber espionage, Congress 
recently introduced a provision barring federal government purchases of 
high-tech equipment produced by Chinese suppliers.111  It is not clear 
whether Congress has considered introducing any mitigating measures that 
would reduce the risks inherent in allowing Chinese suppliers to participate 
in U.S. networks (rather than blocking Chinese suppliers outright).  Given 
this new dynamic, FDI experts have warned that continuing allegations of 
state-sponsored cyber attacks could create additional mistrust and suspicion 
of Chinese companies seeking to invest in the United States.112 
 
D.  Affect Heuristic 
 
“Feelings” play an important role in how people make judgments 
about risk.  Paul Slovic, a leading psychologist among scholars on risk, has 
identified the inextricable link between availability heuristics and people’s 
emotional reactions to risks.113  Slovic proposed that “affect,” a general 
positive or negative feeling people may experience about a certain object, 
can operate as a heuristic that affects people’s judgment about both benefits 
and dangers.114  If a certain risk invokes strong feelings, people will tend to 
resort to a mental shortcut by asking how they feel about the risk, instead of 
making thoughtful deliberation in their evaluation of it.115   Moreover, 
people’s reactions to risks are often based on whether they can easily 
imagine or visualize the “worst-case scenario.”116  If the outcome is vivid 
and bad, it can evoke strong emotions.  And when strong emotions are 
 
110 MANDIANT, AP1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS (2013), available at 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.  
111 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, H.R. 993, 113th Cong., § 516. 
112 See Thilo Hanemann, Chinese FDI in the United States: Q1 2013 Update, RHODIUM GROUP 
(Apr. 30, 2013). 
113 Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
114 Id. 
115 SLOVIC, supra note 98, at 413–28. 
116 SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20, at 45. 
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present, people will tend to ignore the probability that the outcome will 
occur.117  Indeed, research suggests that sometimes people favor regulation 
of certain risks because they focus on the harms, which are effectively on-
screen while ignoring the compensating benefits which are off-screen.118 
Affect heuristics have important implications for risk regulation.  In 
the context of FDI, the question the public faces is difficult (Is FDI 
beneficial to our society?), whereas the answer to an easier and related 
question (Do I like FDI?) comes readily to mind.  Therefore, the public will 
tend to answer the easier question, usually without noticing the 
substitution.  This is especially true when a foreign acquisition poses risks 
to economic or national security.  These sensitive sectors can readily 
invoke negative feelings, which can in turn distort people’s perception of 
benefits and thus produce irrational judgment of the merits of a potential 
FDI transaction.  Recent surveys of public opinion on FDI demonstrate that 
people’s perceptions of FDI are influenced by their feelings toward the 
country of origin: if they like a particular country, they tend to view FDI 
from that country more favorably; if they dislike a certain country, they 
tend to view FDI from that country more negatively.119 
When affect heuristics are at work, negative public representations of 
the Chinese government or Chinese companies could influence public 
perception of Chinese FDI.  If there is overwhelming anti-China sentiment 
in a host country, Chinese FDI is not likely to be welcome, as people will 
tend to judge Chinese FDI as bearing high risks and low benefits.  Indeed, 
many of the challenges posed to Chinese companies investing abroad may 
have to do with a simple lack of trust in the Chinese government.  This 
could eventually contribute to a poisoned environment—one in which it 
would be very difficult to conduct a policy debate about Chinese FDI. 
For instance, U.S. regulators have thwarted Huawei’s several attempts 
to acquire U.S. technology companies in recent years.  In 2007, Huawei 
and its partner investor Bain Capital Partners were forced to withdraw their 
proposed joint acquisition of network equipment maker 3Com following 
their failure to reach a mitigation agreement that adequately addressed the 
U.S. government’s concern.120  Even though Huawei was only taking a 
 
117 Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective 
Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 185, 188 (2001). 
118 SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20, at 41 (citing HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH 
RISK 75–92 (1997)). 
119 Nathan M. Jensen & René Lindstädt, Globalization with Whom: Context-Dependent Foreign Direct 
Investment Preferences (July 2013), http://pages.wustl.edu/files/pages/imce/nathanjensen/globalization_ 
with_whom_working_paper.pdf (The authors cited a Gallup poll finding that 77% of Americans had a 
favorable view of Japanese FDI in comparison to a 42% favorability rating for Chinese FDI.  The authors’ 
own survey found two times the support for Japanese FDI versus Chinese FDI into the United States.). 
120 Press Release, 3Com, 3Com and Bain Capital Partners Announce Mutual Withdrawal of CFIUS 
Application (Feb. 20, 2008). 
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minority interest of 16.5% in 3Com, some Congressional members called 
for blocking the transaction, reciting a litany of alleged espionage related 
activities attributed to China, Huawei’s alleged ties to the Chinese 
Liberation Army, and other publicly reported concerns over Huawei’s 
business.121  In 2011, Huawei chose to divest the assets it acquired from 
3Leaf, a bankrupt California technology company, after CFIUS made a 
negative recommendation against this deal.122  In a recent report on the 
national security issues posed by Huawei and ZTE (another leading 
Chinese telecommunications firm), the U.S. House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence recommended that the United States view with 
suspicion the continued penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market 
by these Chinese companies and that it should block their investment in 
any form.123 
 
E.  Some Reflections 
 
To be sure, the vast majority of Chinese overseas investments are not 
subject to national security review by the host governments, and most that 
are reviewed are approved without any delay.  So why are Western 
governments able to overcome fear about Chinese FDI so often?124 
First, partly due to loss aversion, greenfield investment tends to be 
viewed more favorably by the host countries than acquisition and, 
accordingly, is subject to much less regulatory review.  For instance, data 
collected by Rhodium Group indicates that almost 70 percent of Chinese 
investment in the United States (in terms of numbers of deals) was 
greenfield from 2000 to 2012.125  As Exon-Florio applies solely to foreign 
acquisitions, greenfield investment by Chinese firms is not subject to 
national security review. 
Second, Chinese acquisitions of companies in nonstrategic sectors 
tend to avoid controversy as dynamics—such as loss aversion, availability 
heuristics, and affect heuristics—are more pronounced when the assets 
involved are deemed indispensable and important for the host countries. 
Third, Chinese companies that are looking to invest abroad are 
 
121 Bain Capital Drops Its Bid for 3Com, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB120603627253952409.html. 
122 Shayndi Raice & Andrew Dowell, Haiwei Drops U.S. Deal Amid Opposition, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703407304576154121951088478.html. 
123 U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012). 
124 I thank Scott Kennedy for suggesting this question. 
125 China Investment Monitor, RHODIUM GROUP, http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
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typically assisted by legal advisors who can conduct careful assessment of 
the regulatory risks in the host country.  If a Chinese bid is likely to face 
high regulatory hurdles in the host country, Chinese investors will probably 
be advised against proceeding with the bid.126  Hence, it is not surprising 
that the vast majority of deals that are subject to regulatory review are 
approved because Chinese investors will probably not make a bid in the 
first place if the deal is likely to be rejected. 
This also suggests that Western regulators not only need to assess 
whether they have made a proper decision with regard to those Chinese 
acquisitions that have been made but that they also need to evaluate the 
costs of deterring Chinese companies from investing in the first place.  For 
instance, the failed attempts of Chinese companies such as Huawei to 
invest in the United States have sent a bad signal to many Chinese 
companies that, partly influenced by availability heuristics, wrongly 
believe that the U.S. government is hostile toward Chinese investors.127  As 
a result, these companies decide to look elsewhere to invest. 
 
III.  EXPLOITING FEAR 
 
Well-organized interest groups—including the media, the government, 
and business rivals—can exploit and manipulate undue public fear of 
foreign investment in order to advance their own personal agendas.  In fact, 
fears of foreign investment are likely to be generated endogenously by 
special interests seeking a regulatory response.  This aspect, however, is 
often neglected during heated public debates on foreign investment. 
 
A.  Private Interest Groups 
 
Self-interested private groups have incentives to exploit people’s fear.  
They can advance their personal goals through publicizing vivid examples 
of bad consequences of policies they contest and by encouraging 
deliberation among like-minded people.128  A typical tactic includes the 
exaggeration of risk and over stressing the worst-case scenario.  In the 
context of FDI, private interest groups include competing bidders, business 
rivals, and other stakeholders who can utilize foreign investment review 
processes to obtain leverage over other parties or to impact the timing and 
certainty of the transaction. 
For instance, there is an overwhelming consensus among FDI experts 
 
126 I thank Thilo Hanemann for suggesting this point. 
127 Anthony Lin, Can China Change CFIUS?, LAW.COM (May 13, 2013), http://www.alm.law.com/ 
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202599753882&thepage=1. 
128 See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 20, at 91. 
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that the Dubai Ports World case was highly politicized.129  In particular, a 
disgruntled supplier to the target company was believed to be the driving 
force behind the political controversy in this case.130  The supplier was 
Eller & Co., a small stevedoring firm in the United States that has had a 
long-standing commercial dispute with the target American firm P&O.  By 
taking advantage of the post-September 11th anti-Arab sentiment, Eller & 
Co. successfully stoked the flame in Washington to block the deal in order 
to increase its leverage.131  Similarly, Huawei’s perennial political and legal 
troubles in the United States seem to have been rooted in its patent disputes 
with rival Cisco.  Officials from Huawei point out that Cisco resorted to 
lobbying U.S. politicians in response to the competition from Huawei, 
which has become a more formidable competitor.132  As discussed in 
further detail in Part IV, Chevron, a rival bidder to CNOOC, played a key 
role in Congress’ hostile actions toward CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of 
Unocal.  It has been reported that Chevron spent tremendous resources 
enlisting supporters and lobbying Congress in order to block the CNOOC 
acquisition.133 
 
B.  The Media 
 
The media’s role in promoting a public discourse of fear is well 
studied.134  Similar to private interest groups, mass media has the power to 
influence underlying dynamics and amplify the salience of consequences.  
There are two forces at work here.  The first is the media’s incentive to 
respond to people’s negativity bias.135  As people are loss averse, they tend 
to pay more attention to and give more weight to negative rather than 
positive experiences or information.  In order to increase ratings and 
viewership, the media will respond asymmetrically to information by 
selectively choosing gripping instances to attract attention.136   As the 
saying goes: “If it bleeds, it leads.”  The second force at work here is 
availability heuristics.  Kahneman has long observed that media coverage 
 
129 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 140. 
130 Id. at 139. 
131 Id. 
132 See Cecelia Kang, Huawei’s U.S. Competitors Among Those Pushing for Scrutiny of Chinese 
Tech Firms, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-10/business/3550 
0591_1_huawei-and-zte-chinese-government-cisco-systems. 
133 See Jonathan Weisman, In Washington, Chevron Works to Scuttle Chinese Bid, WASH. POST 
(July 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/15/AR2005071501889.html. 
134 David L. Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear, 38 SOC. 
Q. 647 (1997). 
135 Richard Lau, Negativity in Political Perception, 4 POL. BEHAV. 353 (1982). 
136 Stuart N. Soroka, Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic Information, 
68 J. POL. 372, 381 (2006). 
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can warp people’s perception of risks: “The world in our heads is not a 
precise replica of reality; our expectations about the frequency of events are 
distorted by the prevalence and emotional intensity of the messages to 
which we are exposed.”137  As a consequence, the media’s asymmetric 
response to bad news can in turn amplify public fear of bad news, thus 
leading to a vicious cycle in which availability heuristics and media 
incentives aggravate each other.138 
The media’s reaction to the influx of foreign capital into the United 
States in the 1980s offers a good example.  The growing foreign presence 
in the United States sparked a flood of popular news articles and books at 
that time, most of them expressing concern, but few media pieces defended 
FDI.  For instance, Time magazine ran a cover story in 1987 entitled The 
Selling of America: Foreign Investors Buy, Buy, Buy.  Others, however, ran 
sensational headlines such as Foreign Investors: Allies or Aggressors?, 
Foreigners Buy America, and A Nation Hooked on Foreign Funds. 139  
Books on Japanese global dominance also mushroomed during this period.  
These suggested that takeovers of U.S. firms by Japanese firms had reached 
a dangerous level and that FDI would diminish U.S. technological 
capabilities, threaten the U.S. tax base, and reduce the quality and quantity 
of U.S. jobs.140  For instance, in Selling Out: How We Are Letting Japan 
Buy Our Land, Our Industries, Our Financial Institutions, and Our Future, 
published in 1990, the authors tell an alarming story of the transfer of 
American companies and wealth into Japanese hands and characterize FDI 
as an economic “war” in which America is dangerously defenseless.141  In 
1992, Martin Tolchin and Susan Tolchin released their popular book 
Selling Our Security: The Erosion of America’s Assets.142  In this book, the 
authors presented a shocking picture of American manufacturers of critical 
technologies being taken over by foreign investors and an America in grave 
danger of losing its technological edge and becoming dependent on 
overseas suppliers.  They also warned that foreign investment threatened 
America’s economic and political security and called for a stronger 
government role in protecting critical industries.  Similarly, Clyde 
Prestowtiz’s 1992 Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future to 
 
137 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 138. 
138 SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 102. 
139 GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 46, at 10. 
140 See, e.g., DANIEL BENSTEIN, YEN! JAPAN’S NEW FINANCIAL EMPIRE AND ITS THREAT TO 
AMERICA (1988); MARK MASON, EUROPE AND THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE (1998); DOUGLAS FRANTZ 
& CATHERINE COLLINS, SELLING OUT: HOW WE ARE LETTING JAPAN BUY OUR LAND, OUR 
INDUSTRIES, OUR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND OUR FUTURE (1990); MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN 
TOLCHIN, SELLING OUR SECURITY: THE EROSION OF AMERICA’S ASSETS (1992); CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, 
TRADING PLACES: HOW WE ARE GIVING OUR FUTURE TO JAPAN (1992). 
141 See FRANTZ & COLLINS, supra note 140. 
142 See TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 140. 
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Japan elicited great anxiety and inflamed fear among the American public 
that the Japanese were on the verge of dominating America.143  Yet these 
dire predictions about the threat of Japanese investment simply never came 
to pass.  Rather than decline relative to Japan in the 1990s, U.S. 
technological capabilities rose in large part because of the expansion of 
information technology-based industries in the United States. 144   As 
Graham and Marchick commented: “In hindsight, much of the furor over 
Japanese FDI in the United States now seems exaggerated or even 
downright silly.”145 
Similar to the situation with Japan two decades ago, China is now at 
the center of the media spotlight.  In November 2010, the Economist 
declared on its cover that “China Buys Up the World.”146  Other magazines 
like Forbes and the Independent have run similar cover stories about the 
Chinese shopping spree abroad.147  Books on China’s growing dominance 
have become highly popular in recent years, with lurid titles including: 
When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End 
of the Western World; Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian 
Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century; Eclipse: Living in the 
Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance; and China, Inc.: How the Rise of 
the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World.148  These news 
headlines and books can therefore become a source of fear that China is 
dominating the world and poses a threat to the West. 
 
C.  Governments 
 
Driven by their own interests in re-election or promotion, government 
officials in democratic societies respond to the public’s concern about risk 
even if a particular fear is groundless.  Kent Weaver, a political scientist, 
has called this phenomenon “the politics of blame avoidance.”149  This is 
rooted in the loss aversion of human beings, as voters tend to be more 
sensitive to real or potential losses than to gains.  As Weaver puts it: 
 
143 See PRESTOWTIZ, supra note 140. 
144 See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 24. 
145 Id. at 95. 
146 See Buying Up the World: The Coming Wave of Chinese Takeovers, ECONOMIST (Nov. 13, 2010). 
147 See, e.g., China Buys the World, FORTUNE (Oct. 26, 2009); The Great Haul of China: As Beijing’s 
Spending Spree Extends to Brazil, What Does It Mean for the World?, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 2010). 
148 See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE RISE OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM 
AND THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD (2009); STEPHEN HALPER, BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S 
AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010); ARVIND 
SUBRAMANIAM, ECLIPSE: LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC DOMINANCE (2011); TED 
FISHMAN, CHINA, INC.: HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE 
WORLD (2006). 
149 R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371 (1986). 
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“Voters are more sensitive to what has been done to them than what has 
been done for them.”150  In response to public demand, politicians are more 
motivated to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than to claim credit 
for popular ones.151  As a result, governments tend to react in response to 
temporary fear without investigating the facts and consequences—a 
tendency that can come at a dear cost and impose risks of its own.  For 
instance, critics suggest that President George W. Bush’s administration 
exaggerated the need for a “war on terrorism” in part because the 
exaggeration served his political interests.152 
In the context of FDI, it has been observed that those who were most 
eager to revamp foreign investment policy in the United States in the 1970s 
were members of Congress from districts and states receiving the bulk of 
new investments rather than “members of some aggrieved interest group or 
vigilant guardians of national security.”153  Reacting strongly to complaints 
“in their voting districts about the invasion of the country by rich foreign” 
multinationals, these congressional members introduced “bills ranging 
from the prudent to the xenophobic.”154  While they “did not have access to 
the accurate information needed to take sound policy positions, they had 
little to lose” in arguing against foreign investment.155  Needing to appease 
the popular demand for anti-foreigner policies, they had great incentive to 
appear responsive, “to draw further attention to the issue and to 
grandstand.”156 
Another illustrative case is Dubai Ports World’s rebuffed attempt to 
acquire six U.S. ports in 2006.  When the public furor against this deal 
rose, some members of Congress decided that they had to “do 
something.”157  For instance, the congressional leaders denounced the deal 
as “transfer[ing] title to the Devil.”158  Representative Peter King of New 
York also warned against this deal, alleging that the UAE had been 
involved with terrorists in the past: “This was only 4 1/2, five years ago 
that they were very close to Bin Laden, they were supporting Taliban . . . 
[a]nd unless there’s been a complete transformation, I have real 
 
150 Id. at 373. 
151 Id. 
152 SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 83. 
153 Kang, supra note 45, at 312; see also Judith Miller, Foreign Investment in the U.S. Economy 
Arouses Congressional Concern: The Buying of America, 38 PROGRESSIVE 42 (1974). 
154 Kang, supra note 45, at 312–13. 
155 Id. at 313. 
156 Id. 
157 Editorial, The Don’t Invest in America Act, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2006, at A12. 
158 John Cranford, Defining ‘Ours’ in a New World, CQ WEEKLY, Mar. 3, 2006, at 592 (Senator 
Frank Lautenberg warns: “Don’t let them tell you this is just the transfer of title.  Baloney.  We 
wouldn’t transfer title to the Devil; we’re not going to transfer title to Dubai.”). 
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concerns.”159  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS), an inter-agency responsible for national security review, was 
“excoriated . . . for their supposed lapse in judgment,” and “many in 
Congress [] argue[d] for greater transparency in the CFIUS process.”160  To 
appear tough on terrorism, some members of Congress threatened “to pass 
legislation forcing [Dubai Ports] World to divest itself of its U.S. 
holdings.”161  Prominent Senators Clinton and Menendez also introduced 
legislation that would prohibit the sale of terminal operations to foreign 
governments.162  To placate these concerns, Dubai Ports World was forced 
to sell its interest in the six U.S. ports. 
Today, sensational reports in tabloids, TV, and radio can quickly build 
heat around a particular takeover transaction from a Chinese company.  
Western politicians worried about their public image are naturally afraid of 
being accused by the media of selling invaluable domestic assets to the 
Chinese or of failing to protect national interests.  For this reason, 
politicians can be reluctant to defend Chinese foreign investments and are 
more prone to taking a hardline approach to placate angry voters. 
More alarmingly, fear in such scenarios is contagious.  Although each 
of the various interest groups is working alone to advance their own 
agendas, they share a unifying goal of amplifying public fear.  Their 
individual endeavors can therefore feed on each other, with the 
consequence that their joint efforts become a formidable force for 
disrupting foreign investment.  Indeed, there exists a positive feedback loop 
among various interest groups.  Public fear about FDI incentivizes the 
media to respond more strongly to negative news rather than positive news 
of FDI, which further amplifies public fear.  Private interest groups exploit 
public fear about foreign investment and lobby for regulatory response.  As 
fear of FDI heightens, politicians take action to respond, as doing so can 
increase their popularity, even if they do not have sufficient grounds to 
respond.  Tough regulatory responses, such as blockage of foreign 
investment, produce sensational headlines.  This results in a vicious cycle 
by further contributing to fear about FDI. 
 
IV.  RESPONSE TO FEAR 
 
When people are fearful, the government is likely to react, even if the 
 
159 Jonathan Weisman, Port Deal to Have Broader Review; Dubai Firm Sought U.S. Security 
Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A1. 
160 See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 140. 
161 Greg Hitt, Lawmakers Keep Up Pressure on Dubai Ports Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2006, at A4. 
162 David D. Kirkpatrick & Patrick McGeehan, Pataki Joins Opposition to Takeover of Ports, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at B3. 
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fears are baseless.163  Moreover, regulators themselves can be susceptible to 
various cognitive biases and thus may overreact to risks.  In the face of 
uncertainty, regulators will often find it more attractive to take 
precautionary measures to avoid blame.  This is especially true when 
people can easily imagine or visualize a “worst-case scenario,” as their 
reactions are often based mostly on the badness and the vividness of the 
outcome rather than on the probability of its occurrence.164  Better safe than 
sorry.  Consequently, governments tend to enthusiastically embrace the 
Precautionary Principle. 165   There are many different forms of 
Precautionary Principles.  Precautionary Principle in its weak form means 
that a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing 
to regulate.166  Sunstein agrees that this is perfectly sensible.167  However, 
he has severely criticized a strong version of the principle, which suggests 
that regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk of harm.168  He 
argues that such overreaction to risks can itself produce potential risks and 
lead to significant loss for societies.169  As he eloquently argues: “The 
Precautionary Principle turns out to be flawed, not because it is vague 
(though it is), and not because it threatens to impede desirable economic 
development (though it does), but because it is paralyzing, forbidding the 
very steps that it requires.”170 
Indeed, the influx of foreign investment from an emerging economy 
such as China represents a novel situation for many Western regulators 
with which they have never dealt before.  Although some of these concerns 
are reminiscent of the anxieties about Japanese FDI two decades ago, there 
are also important distinguishing features.  First, unlike Japan, China is the 
only large economy that is not an ally of Europe or the United States.  
Second, while China is an emerging power with a rapidly modernizing 
economy, “it is also a state with nondemocratic values and an economy 
with a high degree of leverage” and intervention from the state.171  Third, 
“China has a negative track record in industrial and political espionage” 
and a reputation as a proliferator “of sensitive technologies to rogue 
 
163 SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, supra note 20, at viii.  
164 Id. at 41. 
165 See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 27, at 18. 
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170 SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS, supra note 27, at 279. 
171 Thilo Hanemann, Chinese FDI in the United States and Europe: Implications and Opportunities 
for Transatlantic Cooperation, STOCKHOLM CHINA FORUM (June 2011), available at 
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regimes.”172  When information about Chinese FDI is limited, Western 
regulators tend to rely on intuition when thinking about the risks posed by 
Chinese FDI.  Fearing a “worst-case scenario” in which Chinese control of 
domestic economies causes dire political and economic consequences, they 
may be tempted to embrace a strong form of the Precautionary Principle.  
As such, they appeal to the alarmist bias against China and take extreme 
precautionary measures, as revealed in the two examples below—the U.S. 
Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of Unocal 
and the Commission’s increased antitrust scrutiny of Chinese SOEs’ 
acquisitions in Europe. 
 
A.  U.S. Response to Chinese FDI 
 
As Graham and Marchick observe: “The debate over investments 
from China is not the first time that anxiety and opposition have been 
directed toward a single nation.”173  During World War I, the United States’ 
concern regarding German investment in the chemical industry prompted 
the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1917, which provided the 
President with the power to seize foreign-owned assets in the United States 
in either time of declared war or in any “international emergency.”174  In 
the 1970s, the influx of investment from the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries following a politically motivated oil embargo caused a 
near panic among the American public and its policy makers.175  CFIUS 
was consequently established to oversee foreign investment and placate 
Congress’ concern.176  In the 1980s, the emergence of Japan as a large 
direct investor in the United States caused consternation, which ultimately 
propelled Congress to approve the Exon-Florio Amendment, the first body 
of law to establish an investment review regime in the United States.177 
 
1.  The Legal Mechanism178 
 
Under Exon-Florio, the President has the authority to block a foreign 
acquisition if “there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe 
 
172 Id. 
173 See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 96. 
174 Trading with the Enemy Act ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917). 
175 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 20. 
176 Exec. Order No. 11,858(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 7, 1975). 
177 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 29. 
178 In addition to national security regulations, other laws and regulations such as the Hart Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, the Export 
Administration Regulations, and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations can be applicable to 
foreign investment but they are not the focus of this Article. 
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that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens 
to impair the national security,” and if other laws, excepting the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, “do not in the President’s 
judgment provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to 
protect the national security in the matter before the President.”179  As such, 
the passage of Exon-Florio made it possible for the federal government to 
intervene in virtually any foreign acquisition in any industry for reasons of 
“national security,” a nebulous term that Congress intentionally did not 
define in the amendment.180 
In the wake of the controversies over the CNOOC-Unocal and Dubai 
Ports World deals, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) on July 27, 2007, amending Exon-Florio.181  
Among other things, FINSA increases congressional oversight throughout 
the process by requiring CFIUS to adhere to a system of congressional 
briefings and annual reporting.182  Upon completion of each investigation, 
CFIUS must provide Congress with notice of the transaction, the actions 
taken, and certifications of conclusion by CFIUS officials.183  Critics note 
that the increased congressional reporting requirements, together with the 
allowance of access to confidential information pertaining to foreign 
investment by the Congress and state senators, may allow special interest 
groups to gain influence and to politicize the FDI review process.184  As 
observed by one commentator: “With increased congressional involvement 
in the CFIUS review process, there is an increased likelihood of pressure 
from both domestic competitors and target managers to propel, delay, or 
prevent certain proposed foreign acquisitions.”185  
Notably, the U.S. Congress has already taken an active interest in 
Chinese FDI.  In 2007, Congress created a bipartisan committee, the United 
States–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), 
specifically “to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national 
security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship” 
between the United States and China.186  In 2012, the USCC published an 
influential report specifically analyzing the economic and policy 
implications of rising Chinese investment in the U.S. economy.  While the 
 
179 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). 
180 See Kang, supra note 45, at 303. 
181 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007). 
182 Id. § 7. 
183 Id. § 2. 
184 Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional Involvement Is 
Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 329 (2007). 
185 Joanna Rubin Travalini, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Achieving a Balance 
Between National Economy Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 779, 
795 (2009). 
186 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001). 
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report recognizes the welcome, though still modest, economic benefits of 
Chinese FDI, it also warns that such benefits are counterbalanced by the 
policy challenges tied to Chinese FDI.187  With the increased congressional 
involvement with Chinese FDI, commentators note that the potential for a 
Chinese acquisition to become highly politicized is significant.188  Indeed, 
the public reaction, in conjunction with the fiercely negative Congressional 
response to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal, offers a prime example of how 
cognitive biases and emotions can be exploited by various interest groups 
to interfere with the national security review process. 
 
2.  CNOOC’s Proposed Acquisition of Unocal 
 
On June 23, 2005, CNOOC proposed a bid of $18.5 billion for 
Unocal, a California-based oil and gas company with significant assets and 
operations in Asia.  CNOOC’s announcement immediately spurred a 
heated debate among the public and touched off a firestorm in 
Washington.189  Indeed, when CNOOC announced its bid for Unocal, the 
timing could not have been worse.  In 2005, the global demand for oil and 
gas was at the highest level in history and the global excess capacity of oil 
production was at the lowest level in the past decade.190  As the world’s oil 
prices reached historic highs, gasoline prices steadily rose in the United 
States.191  While such hikes can at least partially be explained by American 
consumers’ increased demand for oil, American politicians attributed the 
increase mostly to China’s rising energy demand.192   Only two years 
earlier, China surpassed Japan and became the world’s second largest oil 
consumer, immediately after the United States.193  Therefore, for many 
Americans, CNOOC’s proposed purchase of major U.S. energy resources 
was akin to a hostile force “intruding on our territory and snatching away 
that which was vital for our own long-term survival.” 194 
These strong reactions show that the American public and U.S. 
 
187 SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 19, at ix. 
188 David N. Fagan, The U.S. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for FDI, in 2 INVESTING IN 
THE U.S.: A REFERENCE SERIES FOR CHINESE INVESTORS 17 (2009). 
189 See, e.g., Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Chinese Case Puts Secretive Panel in Spotlight: US Vetting 
of Foreign Takeovers is Hot Topic, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at 22. 
190 H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005). 
191 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON GASOLINE PRICES (May 2006), available at http://www.neo.ne. 
gov/reports/primerongasoline.pdf. 
192 EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME, WHY CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE DOESN’T 
THREATEN THE WEST 177 (2010). 
193 Pablo Bustelo, China and Oil in the Asian Pacific Region: Rising Demand for Oil, 21 NEW 
ENGLAND J. PUB. POL’Y 171, 172 (2007). 
194 STEINFELD, supra note 192, at 178 (Steinfeld provides a detailed discussion of CNOOC’s 
operation and its proposed acquisition of Unocal). 
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politicians have suffered from “endowment effects,” an anomaly 
originating in loss aversion.  Because Unocal is a U.S. based company, the 
American public and policymakers have a natural emotional attachment to 
its domestic oil and gas assets.  The adamant response from the regulators 
shows that they were extremely confident about their judgment, which 
seems to derive from a simple logic: (1) oil is a scarce commodity that is 
indispensable to the effective and normal functioning of the U.S. economy; 
(2) oil prices have been rising and the demand for oil is increasing in the 
United States; (3) therefore it does not make sense to sell these domestic 
resources to foreign companies.  But such thinking misses two important 
pieces of information.  First, oil is a highly fungible commodity.  There is 
no doubt that oil is a scarce resource and that America needs to import 
much oil.  However, the oil market operates on a global scale and it matters 
little where oil supplies originate.195  Fungibility also means that if certain 
oil supplies are artificially channeled to one destination, other oil suppliers 
will be redirected, filling any market that previously relied on the 
channeled supplies.  Indeed, energy experts point out that America’s 
vulnerability to oil supply disruptions is primarily related to how much oil 
it consumes, not where the oil it consumes happens to originate.196  Second, 
the American public seems to have completely ignored the compensating 
benefits of the transaction.  CNOOC was, in fact, the higher of the two 
bidders for Unocal, and Unocal’s shareholders would have been better off 
financially if the deal had gone through. 
In addition to loss aversion, affect heuristics also played an important 
role in shaping the public reaction to the CNOOC bid.  CNOOC is a 
publicly listed company based in Hong Kong, and it is 70% owned by 
China National Offshore Oil Company, one of the largest state-owned oil 
companies in China.  For many Americans, CNOOC is the commercial 
face of the Chinese communist government.  The CNOOC bid also 
coincided with growing uneasiness in the United States over the rise of 
China’s economic and political power, the large bilateral trade deficit with 
China, rising concern about China’s manipulation of its currency, and 
inadequate protection of intellectual property rights.197  As such, System 1 
dominated public thought processes: instead of answering the question of 
whether the CNOOC acquisition was good for America, the American 
public took a shortcut, instead answering the question of whether it “liked” 
the acquisition or even whether it “liked” China in general. 
Availability heuristics further amplified people’s fear of a rising 
 
195 BERNARD A. GELB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22182, UNOCAL CORPORATION’S OIL AND GAS (2005). 
196 Jerry Taylor, CNOOC Bid for Unocal No Threat to Energy Security, CATO INST. (July 19, 2005), 
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/cnooc-bid-unocal-no-threat-energy-security. 
197 DICK K. NANTO, JAMES K. JACKSON, WAYNE M. MORRISON & LAWRENCE KUMINS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33093, CHINA AND THE CNOOC BID FOR UNOCAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2005). 
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China.  Immediately before the CNOOC bid, there had been at least two 
headline transactions involving large Chinese companies’ takeovers in 
America.198   A few months before CNOOC’s announcement, Chinese 
computer maker Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s legendary personal 
computer business caused a stir among the U.S. public and American 
politicians, many of whom expressed concern over the national security 
implications of the deal.  Lenovo’s footsteps were quickly followed by 
Haier Group, one of China’s biggest consumer electronics companies, who 
led a consortium investor group to acquire the Maytag Corporation, an 
American appliance icon.  Three high profile acquisitions occurring in such 
a short period of time came as a shock to the American public, leaving 
them with the impression that Chinese companies were ferociously 
acquiring dazzling American corporate icons and, in the process, taking 
over America.199  Indeed, given nominal oil prices at record levels, strong 
anti-China sentiment in Washington, and recent high profile acquisitions 
signifying China’s growing economic clout, CNOOC’s attempt to acquire 
Unocal produced a “perfect storm” in Congress for a debate on the national 
security implications of Chinese investment in the United States. 
CNOOC was competing with American-owned Chevron, who had 
already made an offer to acquire Unocal for $16.4 billion in cash and 
stock.200  To supplant Chevron’s bid, CNOOC made a more attractive offer 
of $18.5 billion, all in cash.201  Both Chevron and CNOOC hired lobbyists 
to sway public opinion and political leaders.  But Chevron had a “home 
advantage” in its efforts in Washington.  According to the Washington 
Post, Chevron lined up a formidable team of heavyweights in Washington 
to lobby against the CNOOC bid.202  Its main strategy was to convince 
Unocal’s shareholders that CNOOC’s higher all-cash offer was not worth 
the risk of an extensive regulatory and security review.203 
 
198 David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Company Offers $18.5 Billion for Unocal, 





202 See Weisman, supra note 133 (Chevron’s team of heavyweights include: Wayne L. Berman, a 
top fundraiser for President Bush whose wife is the White House social secretary; Drew Maloney, a 
former legislative director of House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.); Kenneth J. Kies, a 
prominent tax lobbyist; former commerce secretary Mickey Kantor; Democratic trade experts Claude 
G.B. Fontheim and Kenneth I. Levinson; and David M. Marchick, a senior trade official in the Clinton 
administration who specializes in national security reviews by the high-level Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States). 
203 David O’Reilly, Chevron’s Pitch, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2005, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/0,,SB112113139861482996,00.html (As announced by David O’Reilly, the then chairman and 
chief executive officer of Chevron: “For Unocal shareholders, the most important issue is clear.  It is a 
choice between a definitive merger agreement with Chevron, which can close in the next four weeks, 
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In addition to lobbying from Chevron, politicians in the United States 
also used the CNOOC transaction as an opportunity to exploit people’s fear 
of rising Chinese FDI in order to advance their own political agendas.  On 
June 24, 2005, Representative William Jefferson, together with forty fellow 
members of Congress, sent a letter to Treasury Secretary John Snow.204  In 
the letter, they characterized the transaction as a symbol of an aggressive 
China taking over scarce energy resources, which would make it 
“increasingly difficult for U.S.-based companies to compete for scarce 
energy resources on the world market against China’s state-owned and/or 
controlled energy companies.”205   They asked that the transaction “be 
reviewed immediately to investigate the implications of the acquisition of 
U.S. energy companies and assets by CNOOC and other government 
controlled Chinese energy companies.”206 
On June 30, 2005, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 344.  
Introduced by Congressman Richard Pombo, the resolution expressed the 
concern that a Chinese state-owned energy company exercising control of 
critical American energy infrastructure and energy production capacity 
could threaten American national security.  It called on the President to 
make a thorough review if the deal went forward.207  On July 13, 2005, the 
House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the CNOOC 
transaction.  Jim Woolsey, a former Central Intelligence Agency Director, 
declared “China is pursuing a national strategy of domination of the energy 
markets and strategic dominance of the West Pacific.” 208   He called 
CNOOC “an organ, effectively, of the world’s largest Communist 
dictatorship,” which should be blocked from acquiring American assets.209  
During the same hearing, Frank Gaffney Jr., President of the Center for 
Security Policy, warned that the sale of Unocal Corp. to CNOOC “would 
have adverse effects on the economic and national security interests of the 
United States,” pointing to “the folly of abetting Communist China’s effort 
to acquire more of the world’s relatively finite energy resources.”210 
 
versus an uncertain and highly contingent proposal from CNOOC, which cannot be executed unless and 
until Unocal shareholders reject the Chevron agreement, or Chevron opts out.”). 
204 Letter to Treasury Secretary John W. Snow from Representative William J. Jefferson et al., 151 
CON. REC. H5570-77 (daily ed. June 30, 2005). 
205 Id. H5574. 
206 Id. 
207 H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005). 




210 “CNOOCERED”: The Adverse National Security Implications of the Proposed Acquisition of 
Unocal by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation: Hearing Before the House Armed Servs. 
Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President, Ctr. for Sec. Policy). 
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On July 29, 2005, the Senate and House representatives agreed to 
adopt the amendment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authored by 
Congressman Pombo.  It required that the secretaries of energy, defense, 
and homeland security conduct a study of China’s growing energy 
requirements and the implications of “such growth on the political, 
strategic, economic, or national security . . . of the United States.”211  The 
Amendment prohibited CFIUS from concluding its national security review 
of an “investment in the energy assets of a United States domestic 
corporation by an entity owned or controlled by the government of the 
People’s Republic of China” until after a period of 141 days.212  That meant 
that CFIUS could not complete its review of a potential CNOOC-Unocal 
transaction for 141 days, or fifty-one days longer than the maximum of 
ninety days established under Exon-Florio.  Notably, Chevron is located in 
the congressional district represented by the chairman of the House 
Committee on Resources, Richard Pombo, the very person introducing 
H.R. 344 and proposing amendment of the energy bill.  On August 2, 2005, 
CNOOC withdrew its offer, ensuring Chevron’s success.  In response to the 
new law, CNOOC released a press release citing “unprecedented political 
opposition . . . creating a level of uncertainty that present[ed] an 
unacceptable risk to our ability to secure this transaction.”213 
There is an overwhelming consensus among FDI and energy experts 
that Congress overreacted to CNOOC’s bid. 214   The Congressional 
Research Service reports that Unocal is an insignificant player in the U.S. 
energy market, accounting for only 0.8% of U.S. production of crude oil, 
condensate, and national gas liquids.215  If the CNOOC-Unocal deal had 
gone through, the combined natural gas production would have amounted 
to about 1% of U.S. consumption, and combined oil production would have 
been equivalent to 0.3% of domestic U.S. consumption.216  Given the 
relatively small size of Unocal’s global oil and gas holdings, a CNOOC 
acquisition would have had a negligible impact on global energy markets.  
Moreover, the majority of Unocal’s reserves are located in Asia and are 
already committed under long-term contracts to serve the Asian regions.217  
 
211 Energy Policy Act, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 1837 (2005). 
212 Id. 
213 Press Release, CNOOC, CNOOC Limited to Withdraw Unocal Bid (Aug. 2, 2005). 
214 See, e.g., JAMES A. DORN, CATO INST., U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF CNOOC 
(2005); Edward M. Graham, No Reason to Block the Deal, 168 FAR E. ECON. REV. 25 (July 2005); 
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 43, at 128–36. 
215 BERNARD A. GELB, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RS22182, UNOCAL CORPORATION’S OIL AND 
GAS 2 (2005). 
216 DICK K. NANTO, JAMES K. JACKSON, WAYNE M. MORRISON & LAWRENCE KUMINS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33093, CHINA AND THE CNOOC BID FOR UNOCAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11 (2005). 
217 Patrick Barta & Matt Pottinger, Why CNOOC May Not Be Such a Big Threat, WALL ST. J. (June 
30, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB112007624176673219. 
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In 2006, a study undertaken by the U.S. Department of Energy at the 
request of Congressman Pombo also concluded that foreign investments by 
China’s national oil companies pose no economic threat to the United 
States.218 
As noted earlier, oil is a fungible commodity and it matters little 
where oil supplies originate.  Therefore, if CNOOC acquired Unocal and 
directly shipped oil to China, instead of buying it on the open market, the 
United States would not be “crowded out”; the Unocal production would 
simply replace other imports that would have gone to China otherwise.219  
Since overall global supply would remain the same, the price of oil would 
not be affected.  CNOOC might absorb a financial loss by selling below 
world price to Chinese customers, but there would be little impact on the 
rest of the world. 
There is also no indication that Unocal possessed any proprietary 
technology that was not already available to CNOOC through private 
vendors, contractors, and other sources.  While Unocal’s knowledge of 
deep water drilling off the Gulf of Mexico is of great value, spreading such 
expertise could result in greater oil production worldwide, benefiting all 
consumers.  Furthermore, CNOOC was willing to relinquish the Gulf of 
Mexico assets if that step would have secured U.S. approval of that 
transaction.220  In fact, CNOOC had agreed not to divert Unocal’s U.S. 
production of oil and gas to other markets and it planned to retain virtually 
all of Unocal’s employees. 221   While there was also concern about 
subsidized finance, that was not a sufficient legal reason to block 
CNOOC’s acquisition.  Indeed, U.S. officials have confirmed that CFIUS 
remains focused on the national security implications of inward FDI.  
Expanding the mandate to cover debates over investment subsidies would 
take CFIUS into terrain far better covered by expertise in other agencies.222 
Unfortunately, these facts were largely downplayed or ignored during 
the policy debate about CNOOC’s bid.  Instead, many U.S. Congress 
members favored precautionary measures and adamantly opposed the 
CNOOC-Unocal deal.  What they may have failed to realize, however, 
were the consequences potentially resulting from their actions—the 
political and economic repercussions of blocking CNOOC’s acquisition.  
 
218 ERICA S. DOWN & PETER C. EVANS, BROOKING INST., UNTANGLING CHINA’S QUEST FOR OIL 
THROUGH STATE-BACKED FINANCIAL DEALS 154 (2006). 
219 DORN, supra note 214. 
220 Dennis K. Berman et al., China Still Has to Prove It Can Close the Deal, WALL ST. J., July 21, 
2005, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112190262333391544.html. 
221 Press Release, CNOOC, Statement by FU Chengyu, Chairman and CEO of CNOOC Ltd. (June 
24, 2005). 
222 Gary Hufbauer et al., Investment Subsidies for Cross-Border M&A: Trends and Policy 
Implications (U.S. Council Found., Occasional Paper No. 2, 2008). 
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As the country with the largest outward investment in the world, the United 
States has a strong interest in maintaining open markets and encouraging 
open investment policies; blocking the CNOOC-Unocal transaction could 
have led to protectionism and ultimately hurt U.S. interests.  If the United 
States prevents Chinese firms from acquiring U.S.-based companies such 
as Unocal, the Chinese will look elsewhere—to friendly states such as 
Canada as well as to rogue states such as Sudan and Iran.223  This could 
actually lead to a worse outcome than what most opponents were worried 
about in the first place. 
Another important aspect that tends to be ignored by U.S. regulators is 
the benefits of globalization.  One of the major benefits of Chinese FDI is 
that the Chinese firms’ venture overseas could help them to learn Western 
games (i.e., the rules in Western institutions).224  This is particularly true 
for Chinese SOEs, who have enjoyed advanced and superior status in 
China and are shielded from competition and regulations.  However, once 
they venture overseas, they will need to play the same games as their 
Western counterparts: they will not only need to comply with local laws 
and regulations but will also be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts 
and litigation.  The exposure to foreign regulations could create a positive 
feedback effect into China, pushing the Chinese government to realize its 
current legal and administrative system may be hindering the chances of 
these companies operating successfully overseas.225 
In fact, the increasing Chinese investment in the United States should 
be viewed as “a hopeful sign” for the future of Chinese–American 
relationships.  As commented by Judge Posner: “[The CNOOC acquisition] 
suggests that China envisages [a] peaceful, constructive commercial 
relationship with the United States.  Otherwise it would not spend billions 
of dollars to acquire assets that ultimately are under the control of our 
government.”226  Indeed, empirical research has shown that trade has the 
benefit of reducing the probability of conflict between nations.227  The 
more assets China invests in the United States, the more the U.S. 
government can hold these assets as hostages against China.  The United 
States is one of the largest foreign investors in the Chinese market.  
Recently Chinese regulators have brought a number of tough regulatory 
 
223 DORN, supra note 214. 
224 See generally STEINFELD, supra note 192. 
225 Danil H. Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, The Rise in Chinese Overseas Investment and What It Means 
for American Business, CHINA BUS. REV., July 1, 2012, available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/ 
the-rise-in-chinese-overseas-investment-and-what-it-means-for-american-businesses/. 
226 Richard A. Posner, Posner’s Comment on Chinese Purchases of American Companies, BECKER-
POSNER BLOG (Aug. 7, 2005), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/08/posners-comment-on-chinese-
purchases-of-american-companies/comments/page/2/. 
227 Solomon W. Polocheck, Conflict and Trade, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (1980). 
ZHANG_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/14 7:25 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business              34:395 (2014) 
 
432 
sanctions against foreign companies for corruption and antitrust 
violations.228  Foreign companies have complained that they have been 
unfairly targeted.229  But the more Chinese companies invest overseas, the 
more Chinese assets will be subject to regulatory control by Western 
regulators.  This in turn could impose constraints on Chinese regulators (if 
their actions have indeed unfairly targeted foreign firms), thus reducing 
friction between the two countries.  In cases of national emergency, such as 
a military conflict, the U.S. government could even nationalize Chinese 
assets.  For example, after the outbreak of the Second World War, 
subsidiaries of German companies operated in the United States were cut 
off from their parent companies in Germany.230  These German subsidiaries 
operated in the United States came under U.S. control, and there is no 
evidence that they attempted to act in the interests of Germany against the 
United States.231 
 
B.  European Response to Chinese FDI 
 
The EU’s response to foreign takeovers has largely been dominated by 
the drive to create a single internal market.  The 1957 Treaty of Rome 
called for members to “progressively abolish between themselves all 
restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in 
Member States.”232   In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty further expanded 
Europe’s achievements on internal freedom of capital movements to third 
countries.233  Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) stipulates that “all restrictions on the movement of capital 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries 
shall be prohibited.” 234   The legal framework allows very limited 
exceptions, thus leaving EU member states with the most liberal economies 
among developed countries in the regulation of FDI.235 
 
 
228 Michael Martina & Kazunori Takada, Rattled by Investigations, Foreign Firms in China Beef 
Up Compliance, REUTERS, Sep. 2, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/02/us-
china-investigations-idUSBRE9810NG20130902. 
229 Victoria Ruan, EU Group Wants Fairer Policies for Foreign Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 
6, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1304205/eu-group-wants-fairer-policies-foreign-firms. 
230 See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 17, at 102. 
231 Id. 
232 Treaty of Establishing the European Economic Community ch. 4, art. 67, Mar. 25, 1957, 4300 
U.N.T.S. 294. 
233 Treaty on European Union art. 73(b), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. 
234 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 63, May 9, 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 70 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
235 THILO HANEMANN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, RHODIUM GRP., CHINA INVESTS IN EUROPE: 
PATTERNS, IMPACTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 64–65 (2012). 
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1.  The Legal Mechanism 
 
Currently there is no foreign investment control at the EU level.  But 
such investment control may exist at the national level.  Pursuant to the 
TFEU, EU member states retain the right to impose restrictions on foreign 
investment based on public security considerations, as long as those 
restrictions do not result in arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade.236  The EU law does not define national security 
clearly, leaving the door open to broad interpretation. 237   Indeed, 
investment security regimes at the member state level vary widely across 
Europe.  Countries such as France and Germany have established 
investment reviews that are used to address security concerns, whereas 
those like Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands do not have any investment measures related to public order 
and essential security considerations.238 
As EU member states have a mandate to protect the single market, the 
Commission has been closely monitoring restrictions imposed by member 
states on capital movements.  As observed by Hanemann & Rosen: “Cases 
involving economic nationalism against foreign takeovers of local 
companies . . . were typically met with an ultimatum for compliance and a 
filing with the European Court of Justice . . . .” 239   For instance, the 
European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR) recognizes that member 
states may take appropriate measures to protect certain “legitimate 
interests” such as public security, plurality of the media, and prudential 
rules.240  In practice, however, the Commission has narrowly interpreted the 
scope of these “legitimate interests.”241  In fact, member states have rarely 
 
236 TFEU, supra note 234, art. 346. 
237 See generally OECD, PROPORTIONALITY OF SECURITY-RELATED INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: 
A SURVEY OF PRACTICES (2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/40699890.pdf; see 
also OECD, TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY FOR INVESTMENT POLICIES ADDRESSING NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONCERNS: A SURVEY OF PRACTICES (2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/40700254.pdf. 
238 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-320, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: LAWS AND 
POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TEN COUNTRIES (2008); OECD, IDENTIFICATION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTORS: A FACT FINDING SURVEY OF INVESTMENT REVIEW PROCEDURES (2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/3/45425060.pdf; Robert LaRussa & Lisa Raisner, Foreign Investment 
Review: Mergers National Interest & National Security in 26 Jurisdictions Worldwide, in GETTING THE 
DEAL THROUGH—FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW 2013 (2013). 
239 HANEMANN & ROSEN, supra note 73, at 65. 
240 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 Jan. 2004 on the Control of Concentrations 
Between Undertakings, art. 21(4), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter EUMR]. 
241 See, e.g., Case IV/M.1616, BSCH/Champalimaud, Regulation (EC) No. 4064/89 (July 20, 1999); 
Commission Press Release IP/00/1338 of November 22, 2000; Commission Press Release IP/06/1265 
of September 26, 2006. 
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been successful in blocking foreign acquisitions on “legitimate interests” 
grounds.242 
 
2.  Recent Chinese SOEs’ Acquisitions in Europe 
 
In general, Europe is perceived as a more welcoming destination for 
Chinese investment than the United States.  This has partly contributed to 
the surge of capital influx into the EU in recent years, especially after the 
financial crisis.  The Rhodium Group estimated that in 2011, FDI from 
China tripled from $3 billion to $10 billion, whereas inflows to the United 
States remained unchanged at $5 billion.243  Such a large influx of capital 
into Europe has alarmed European regulators, leading to “a fear of 
politically and strategically motivated takeovers executed by Chinese 
SOEs.” 244   In 2010, Xinmao, a Chinese cable maker, proposed an 
acquisition of Draka, a Dutch fiber cable producer.  This prompted 
European Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship Antonio Tajani 
to call for a EU-wide foreign investment review to protect European know-
how and technology from Chinese investors.245  Tajani and his colleague 
Michael Barnier later wrote to EU President José Manuel Barroso 
emphasizing the need for a pan-European investment review regime: “[W]e 
have to make sure it’s not a front for something else, in terms of taking our 
know-how abroad . . . .”246  As he stated below: “The time to fireproof your 
house is before it catches fire . . . we want to be sure we know who is 
investing in Europe, and why.”247  Echoing such concerns, the European 
Parliament called for a European body “entrusted with the ex ante 
evaluation of foreign strategic investment.”248  Politicians in Europe have 
further expressed concern that the current patchwork of investment rules in 
different EU member states risks a race to the bottom in which some 
member state authorities may abandon attempts to screen for security in the 
 
242 See, e.g., Case IV/M.567, Lyonnaise des Eaux SA/Northumbrian Water Group, Regulation 
(EEC) No. 4064/89 (Mar. 29, 1995); Case IV/M.759, Sun Alliance/Royal Insurance, Regulation (EC) 
No. 4064/89 (June 18, 1996).  See also RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 852–53 
(7th ed. 2012). 
243 HANEMANN & ROSEN, supra note 73, at 36. 
244 See John W. Miller, Chinese Companies Embark on Shopping Spree in Europe, WALL ST. J. 
(June 6, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704355304576214683640225122; see 
also Maaike Okano-Heijmans & Frans-Paul van der Putten, Europe Needs to Screen Chinese Investment, 
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009). 
245 See Miller, supra note 244 (citing interview with Industry Commissioner Tajani). 
246 John W. Miller, Bid Dropped as EU Raises China’s Wall, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576065313773996124.html. 
247 Miller, supra note 244. 
248 Resolution on “EU and China: Unbalanced Trade?”, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA 0218 (2012). 
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rush to attract Chinese money.249 
Some scholars suggest that there are two ways to overcome this 
problem.  The first is to create a EU-wide body, similar to CFIUS, to vet 
foreign investment.250  However, this is likely to be met with significant 
opposition from member states, who may have conflicting political and 
economic interests and thus be reluctant to cede jurisdiction to a EU-wide 
body.  An alternative avenue for response is to strengthen the monitoring of 
Chinese FDI on grounds of competition policy.251  This appears to be a 
more feasible approach since the Commission is already empowered to 
review cases at the EU level.  Indeed, this seems to be exactly what has 
happened recently. 
Since 2011, acquisitions by Chinese SOEs in Europe have been 
subject to heightened merger review by the Commission.  In each of the 
recently notified cases involving Chinese SOEs, the Commission has 
considered the “worst-case scenario.”  That is, operating on the hypothetical 
assumption that all Chinese SOEs are controlled by the Chinese government 
and thus should be treated as a single entity, the Commission has 
considered whether a given transaction will pose any anti-competitive 
harm.252 
This “worst-case scenario” approach has introduced significant 
complications for transactions involving Chinese SOEs.  From a procedural 
standpoint, if all Chinese SOEs are deemed part of the same entity, then 
presumably the turnover requirement under the EUMR will surely be met 
for the Chinese party, which would significantly increase the likelihood 
that a Chinese acquisition would need to be notified to the Commission.  In 
fact, under the “worst-case scenario” considered by the Commission, any 
acquisition involving any Chinese SOE would definitely require 
notification to the Commission, as long as the European target’s turnover 
also meets EU thresholds.  From a substantive standpoint, if all Chinese 
SOEs are treated as part of a single entity, then competitive assessments 
would focus on the target and all the Chinese SOEs in the same sector, 
 
249 See Meunier, supra note 59; see also GODEMENT, PARELLO-PLESNER & RICHARD, supra note 60. 
250 See Meunier, supra note 59; see also GODEMENT, PARELLO-PLESNER & RICHARD, supra note 60. 
251 See Meunier, supra note 59; see also GODEMENT, PARELLO-PLESNER & RICHARD, supra note 60. 
252 See, e.g., Case COMP/M.6111, Huaneng/Intergen, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Feb. 2, 
2011); Case COMP/M.6082, China National Bluestar/Elkem, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Mar. 31, 
2011); Case COMP/M.6151, Petrochina/Ineos, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (May 13, 2011); Case 
COMP/M.6113, DSM/Sinochem/JV, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (May 19, 2011); Case 
COMP/M.6141, China National Agrochemical/Makhteshim Agan, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Oct. 
3, 2011); Case COMP/M.6235, Honeywell/Sinochem/JV, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Dec. 2, 
2011); Case COMP/M.6700, Talisman/ Sinopec/JV, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Oct. 16, 2012); 
Case COMP/M.6715, CNOOC/NEXEN, Regulation (EEC) No. 139/2004 (Nov. 12, 2012); Case 
COMP/M.6807, Mercuria Energy Asset Management/Sinomart KTS Development/Vesta Terminals, 
Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Mar. 7, 2013). 
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rather than the target and the acquiring Chinese SOE alone, which could 
adversely affect transactions. 
So far the Commission has unconditionally cleared all the notified 
cases involving Chinese SOEs because even under the “worst-case 
scenario,” these transactions would not pose any anti-competitive harm.  
Therefore, the Commission left open this issue of whether Chinese SOEs 
should be viewed as a single entity in all its published decisions up to date.  
However, the Commission continued to apply the “worst-case scenario” 
approach to each notified transaction involving Chinese SOEs, and indeed 
has taken jurisdiction over at least one case where the turnover of the 
notifying Chinese SOE clearly did not meet the EU merger notification 
thresholds.253  Thus even though the Commission has not openly taken a 
position on the independence of Chinese SOEs, its review practice to date 
indicates that it has tacitly reached a conclusion that Chinese SOEs are not 
independent from each other and should be viewed as a single entity. 
It is understandable that the Commission would want to exercise 
caution in dealing with Chinese FDI, but the “worst-case scenario” 
approach is precisely the kind of paralyzing precautionary measure that 
could itself inflict cost and create risks.  To begin, the “worst-case scenario” 
approach significantly increases the regulatory risks and burdens for the 
transacting parties, which could have the effect of deterring Chinese 
investors.  As the Commission has yet to reach an official conclusion on 
this issue, transacting parties are left with no guidance as to whether they 
need to notify their transactions to the Commission when their acquiring 
Chinese SOE’s turnover does not satisfy the EU thresholds.  Moreover, 
once a transaction has been notified, the Commission usually requires the 
parties to gather market data for all other Chinese SOEs in the same 
sector—a mission nearly impossible since Chinese SOEs are presumed to 
be independent.  Indeed, unless the other relevant SOEs voluntarily 
disclose their data, it is almost impossible for the parties to obtain such 
information. 
A more vexing issue is that the single entity theory is a double-edged 
sword.  If Chinese SOEs in the same sector are treated as part of a single 
entity, agreements as well as mergers between them would arguably be 
exempted from EU competition law.254  Therefore, applying the “worst-
case scenario” approach to Chinese SOEs is very costly—the Commission 
risks creating a precedent that will work against itself in the future when it 
wants to exercise jurisdiction over mergers or cartels between Chinese 
SOEs.  The EU has a potential interest in intervening in those cases 
 
253 This is based on the observation of a European competition lawyer representing a Chinese SOE 
in connection with its acquisition in Europe.  The lawyer wishes to stay anonymous. 
254 See Zhang, supra note 23, at 824–26. 
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because Chinese SOEs have access to European markets either via their 
affiliates based in Europe or via exports.  In the United States, there have been 
at least three class action suits against Chinese companies for conducting 
export cartels.255  In March 2013, Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. and its 
affiliate company North China Pharmaceutical Group Co. were found 
liable for fixing export prices on vitamin C in the United States and were 
ordered to pay $162 million in damages.256  Similarly, although mergers 
between Chinese SOEs take place in China, they will potentially have 
effects on European markets as long as they make sales in Europe.  But if 
the Commission treats all Chinese SOEs as part of a single entity, then it 
will presumably lose jurisdiction over these important mergers. 
Moreover, the current approach adopted by the Commission may 
jeopardize the EU’s hard-earned reputation as an open environment for 
foreign investment.  Indeed, the Commission risks the appearance of 
applying a double standard to Chinese SOEs, as it has not explained in its 
decision why it has not applied the same evidentiary standard in cases 
involving Chinese SOEs and cases involving European SOEs. 257  
Practitioners have already raised concerns as to whether the Commission 
has been influenced by political factors in reviewing cases involving 
Chinese firms.258  This could tarnish the reputation of the EUMR, a body of 
antitrust law that should be firmly grounded in economics rather than 
political concerns.259 
So why did the Commission fail to see the adverse consequences that 
 
255 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Resco Prods., Inc. v. 
Bosai Minerals Grp., No. 06-235, 2010 WL 2331069 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2010); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. 
v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated sub 
nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 
Dingding Tina Wang, When Antitrust Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider U.S.-China WTO 
Disputes in Deciding Antitrust Cases Involving Chinese Exports, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1096 (2012).  It 
should be noted that these cases only involve Chinese companies that are privately owned. 
256 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation [Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. v. Hebei Welcome 
Pharm. Co. Ltd., et al.], No. 06-md-1738, No. 05-cv-0453 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2013). 
257 See Zhang, supra note 23, at 822–24, 830 (“[C]ontrary to the principle under the EUMR and 
previous Commission cases involving European SOEs, the Commission has seemed to focus on 
whether the Chinese State is able to exert influence over the SOEs, rather than whether such influence 
has been exerted in practice.”). 
258 See, e.g., Odd Stemsrud, “China Inc” Under Merger Regulation Review: The Commission’s 
Approach to Acquisitions by Chinese Public Undertakings, 32 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 481, 
486 (2011) (“The practical approach of the Commission to undertake an entire “China Inc” alternative 
assessment could also be viewed in light of the de lege ferenda view of Vice President Tajani, that the 
Commission needs additional powers to investigate Chinese investments in the EU.  In this political 
environment it is, perhaps, understandable that DG COMP applies the old warning: “Approach with 
caution.”). 
259 Some scholars in Europe have held a contrary view that the EU competition law has and should 
include other public policy objectives.  See generally CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (2009). 
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could result from its “worst-case scenario” approach?  This Article posits 
that cognitive biases have led them astray.  Because the consequences of a 
communist Chinese state controlling the Western economy are cognitively 
available and highly salient, strong emotions are triggered in European 
publics and regulators and fear of Chinese FDI is heightened.  When people 
have a strong negative affect toward Chinese FDI, they tend not to think 
much about the probability of harm but focus instead on possible disastrous 
consequences.  As such, European regulators have reacted with extreme 
caution in dealing with Chinese investment and have focused on “worst-
case scenarios”—a salient manifestation of alarmist bias.  In fact, European 
regulators themselves have influenced public perception of the risks 
associated with Chinese FDI.  As evidenced by Antonio Tajani’s warning 
about the potential dire consequences of Chinese investment in Europe, 
regulators can themselves act as availability entrepreneurs and further 
amplify European fear of Chinese FDI.  Moreover, when the Commission 
forms the belief that a Chinese SOE has no independent power of decision-
making, it tends to seek evidence supporting such a thesis rather than 
evidence challenging it.  To make matters worse, alarmist bias and 
confirmation bias are worsened by inadequate checks and balances in the 
EU competition regime.  Wouter Wils, a leading scholar on EU 
competition law, has long observed that antitrust regulators are susceptible 
to prosecutorial biases and that this problem is particularly acute for the 
Commission as it combines the prosecutorial function with the adjunctive 
function.260 
But how likely is it that the Chinese government still continues to 
control the decision-making of Chinese SOEs?  The Commission’s analysis 
is silent on this point.  Indeed, if there is a one percent chance that the 
Chinese government maintains close control of the decision-making of the 
SOEs, the action taken by the Commission should differ from a scenario in 
which there is a ninety-nine percent chance that it does.  To resolve this 
issue, the Commission needs to take a step back and re-examine the 
historical and contemporary dynamics of SOE governance in China. 
Thirty years ago, few would have doubted that the whole Chinese 
economy was one big firm, and that none of the Chinese SOEs possessed 
independent power of decision-making.  But China has made great strides 
in reforming its SOE system.  In the 1990s, the Chinese government 
privatized a large number of small and medium size SOEs and conducted 
extensive restructuring of the remaining larger SOEs.261  In 2003, the 
 
260 See WOUTER P. J. WILS, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 164–65 (2005). 
261 See OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM: CHINA—DEFINING THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE (2009) [hereinafter OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY 
REFORM], http://www.oecd.org/china/42390089.pdf. 
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Chinese government created the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), a special commission directly 
subordinate to the State Council, to act as a fiduciary to manage its 
ownership interests.262  One of the primary objectives in establishing the 
SASAC was to “separate the government’s social and public management 
functions from the role as the investor of the state-owned assets in terms of 
institutional framework.”263  Pursuant to the Enterprise State-Owned Assets 
Law promulgated in 2008, SASAC is entitled to rights as a shareholder, 
including returns on its investment and approval of any major ownership 
decisions such as mergers, bankruptcy, and the issuance of new securities 
of the firm.264  In addition, SASAC has the authority to appoint directors, 
managers, and supervisors of wholly SOEs, and to nominate directors and 
supervisors in partially state-owned enterprises.265  Besides the exercise of 
such rights, SASAC is not allowed to intervene directly in management or 
day-to-day operations.266  Thus it appears that Chinese SOEs enjoy a power 
of decision-making independent of SASAC, which essentially exercises 
basic ownership functions on behalf of the Chinese government as a non-
managing trustee. 
On the other hand, there are also good reasons for the Commission to 
be skeptical about Chinese SOEs.  While the creation of the SASAC has 
weakened the administrative ties between SOEs and government agencies, 
the ties have not been completely severed.  In particular, the CCP—the 
single ruling party in China—is omnipresent at all levels of the government 
and the national economy and still exercises influence over Chinese SOEs 
through the Soviet-style nomenklatura system.  As a result, the 
appointments of senior executives at Chinese SOEs, as well as the future 
career paths of the top SOE executives, are determined by the CCP, which 
gives incentives to SOE executives to follow the government’s policy 
guidance.267  However, due to the secretive nature of the CCP, it is not 
exactly clear to what extent it still influences the decision-making of senior 
executives at Chinese SOEs.  This poses significant challenges to the staff 
at the merger unit of the Commission, who are antitrust law experts but 
 
262 See China State-Owned Asset Management System Reform Entering New Stage, SASAC (May 
23, 2003), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2964727/n2974401/2976097.html. 
263 Id.  For a detailed discussion on SASAC as a controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs, see Lin 
& Milhaupt, supra note 22, at 734–46. 
264 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoyou Qiye Zichan Fa (中华人民共和国国有企业资产法) 
[The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009) arts. 12, 16, 18, 21, 
30–38 (China). 
265 See id. art. 22. 
266 See id. arts. 6, 14. 
267 Nan Lin, Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future, 7 
MGM’T & ORG. REV. 63 (2010); see also Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 22, at 738–39. 
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may not necessarily understand the corporate governance of SOEs 
operating in a transitional economy like China. 
To be sure, this Article does not argue that the Commission should 
just sit back and do nothing.  Given the opaque governance structure of 
Chinese SOEs, it is perfectly understandable for European regulators to be 
vigilant about the potential risks of Chinese SOEs’ investment in Europe.  
But prior to adopting any precautionary measures, European regulators 
should conduct careful cost and benefit analysis to study the consequences 
of their regulatory actions.  Importantly, when evidence is speculative and 
the regulatory cost is high, regulators should consider whether there are any 
less intrusive measures to mitigate the risks.  Under the current European 
legal framework, a more pragmatic approach seems to involve treating 
Chinese SOEs as independent under EUMR and dealing with any potential 
economic and political risks under the national security review regimes that 
exist at the member state level.  This, however, is not an ideal position for 
the Commission as it could have interests in conflict with those of 
individual member states.  Europe is now confronted with a thorny issue: 
should member states be left with the exclusive power to regulate FDI 
under national security regimes or should the Commission be empowered 
to do so as well?  Whatever Europe decides in the future, it must ensure 
that its antitrust review is not swayed by political considerations. 
 
V.  WHO IS DRIVING CHINESE FDI? 
 
When information about Chinese FDI is limited, people tend to rely 
on intuition and feelings in making judgments.  In particular, associative 
memory, the core of System 1, will try to construct a coherent 
interpretation of the motivation of Chinese FDI.  People can feel very 
confident about their judgment, without realizing that it is in fact based on 
inadequate evidence.  Ironically, knowing little about China may actually 
make it easier for people to fit everything they know into a coherent 
pattern.  The story is simple: (1) most Chinese FDI is made by companies 
owned by the Chinese government; (2) the Chinese government actively 
encourages Chinese SOEs to venture overseas to make foreign investment; 
and (3) therefore Western governments should be vigilant, as such 
investments could be  “Trojan horses” of the Chinese government. 
As a consequence, the public debate on foreign investment from China 
becomes deeply imbalanced.  Most analysis of Chinese FDI policy has 
placed the central government in the driver’s seat.  The typical worries are 
that Chinese SOEs looking for expansion opportunities overseas are not 
pure market players but are simply puppets that respond to the policies and 
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instructions of the Chinese government. 268   But appearances can be 
deceptive.  The Chinese economy, as China expert Yasheng Huang acutely 
observes, “is so complicated that what appears to be straightforward and 
obvious on the surface is not at all so once we dig into the details.”269  
Indeed, what the Western news reports and policy debate often fail to 
address is that the rapid increase of Chinese FDI is in fact predicated on a 
number of institutional distortions in the Chinese economy.  Crucially, they 
ignore or downplay that agency problems, particularly empire building 
incentives, exist at the Chinese SOE level.  Yet these incentives are one of 
the most important factors powering the surge of Chinese FDI.  It would be 
difficult to estimate the exact amount these empire building incentives have 
factored in Chinese FDI, but a close study of outbound investment made in 
the oil and gas sector reveals that agency problems are pervasive and weigh 
heavily on the investment decisions of Chinese national oil companies 
(NOCs). 
 
A.  Empire-Building Incentives 
 
Empire building is a manifestation of agency problems existing in 
firms.  Due to the information asymmetry between shareholders and 
management, the latter may retain private information about the firm and 
not reveal it to the former.  Conflict arises when management maximizes its 
own interest at the expense of shareholders.  Michael Jensen, a leading 
scholar on corporate finance, has proposed a free cash flow theory 
suggesting that management has perverse incentives to grow beyond 
optimal size. 270   Instead of paying free cash flow to shareholders, 
management has the incentive to spend free cash flow to fund 
acquisitions—this not only increases the amount of resources under its 
control, but can also increase its compensation (as compensation is 
positively linked to the growth of a company).  Free cash flow theory 
therefore predicts that managers of firms with unused borrowing power and 
large free cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or even 
value-destroying mergers.  To prevent overinvestment, economists have 
shown that external capital markets such as debt can serve the monitoring 
role of disciplining managerial use of free cash flow.271 
 
268 SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 19, at ix. 
269 YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
THE STATE 2 (2008). 
270 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (Free cash flow refers to cash flow in excess of that required to fund all 
projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.). 
271 Id.; see also René M. Stulz, Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FIN. 
ECON. 3 (1990). 
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Jensen’s research on empire building has mainly focused on the 
conflict between management and a diffuse group of shareholders.  But 
empire-building incentives loom even larger for management at SOEs.  
Janos Kornai, a Hungarian economist, has long posited that SOEs are 
afflicted with “investment hunger.”272  Due to soft budget constraints, 
SOEs operating in a socialist system do not need to bear the loss from 
faulty investment decisions.  Moreover, it is difficult to hold management 
accountable since SOEs have many policy burdens, and profits cannot be 
used as a sole evaluating factor.  Indeed, research has shown that agency 
costs associated with managerial empire building behavior are more severe 
when corporate governance is weak273 and managers are less accountable to 
their shareholders.274 
SOEs in China have an insatiable desire to expand: the bigger it is, the 
more powerful it becomes; the more powerful it is, the easier it becomes to 
obtain financial resources for overseas expansion.  It thus grows even 
bigger and more powerful, resulting in a vicious cycle.  Chinese firms are 
vying to become leaders in their particular industries so that they will be 
deemed indispensible to local and central governments.  Such incentives 
have been well documented in Yasheng Huang’s Selling China, an 
excellent book about FDI into China.275  Huang finds that SOEs’ obsession 
with technology drives them to partner with foreign multinational 
companies to create joint ventures in China.  As profits no longer serve as a 
guiding criterion, SOEs like to use tangible inputs to showcase their 
competitiveness.276  This leads to a destructive consequence: SOEs pile up 
hard assets and the government allocates resources according to the 
technological capabilities of the SOEs.277  Worryingly, Huang identifies 
evidence that SOEs know how to accumulate assets but do not know how 
to use them efficiently; he points out that Chinese SOEs are more interested 
in spending money to acquire hard assets than in generating positive return 
from their assets.278 
Worse yet, distortions in China’s capital markets compound distortions 
 
272 JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 162 (1992) 
(“Expansion drive is a fact of life for the bureaucracy.  And because this system has only bureaucrats 
and no real owners, there is almost total lack of internal, self-imposed restraint that might resist this 
drive.  The investment hunger is ubiquitous.”). 
273 Pornsit Jiraporn, Yuong Sang Kim, Wallace N. Davidson & Manohar Singh, Corporate 
Governance, Shareholder Rights and Firm Diversification: An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. BANK. & FIN. 
947 (2006). 
274 Ole-Kristian Hope & Wayne B. Thomas, Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure, 46 
J. ACCOUNT. RES. 591 (2008). 
275 YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA 7 (2003). 
276 Id. at 223–24. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. at 136–37. 
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in managerial incentives.279  China’s capital markets are dominated by 
banks, especially the big four state-controlled banks.  As China’s financial 
system allocates resources according to a political rather than economic 
pecking order of firms,280 inefficient SOEs enjoy a superior advantage in 
obtaining funds for investment.  As pointed out by Morck, Yeung, and 
Zhao, China’s recent FDI surge is likely a manifestation of its inability to 
reinvest efficiently its high corporate and individual savings.281 
With superior access to financing, Chinese SOEs have been expanding 
not only in the domains of their specific industries, but also investing 
outside.  Indeed, Chinese SOEs have been seen elbowing out private 
domestic firms in competitive industries, especially those with high risk 
and high return.  This phenomenon has been known as “the state advances, 
the private sector retreats.”  The problem has been exacerbated by the 
recent financial crisis, as the Chinese government loosened monetary 
policies to increase bank lending and SOEs became the main benefactors of 
the policy.  For example, a government spokesperson recently admitted that 
74% of the SOEs owned by the central government are engaged in the 
highly profitable but risky real estate business and that these companies 
also run about 2,500 hotels in the country.282  These SOEs face significant 
public pressure and the official media has criticized them for “not doing 
their proper business.”283  According to Xinhua News Agency, the Chinese 
government recently ordered 78 companies to withdraw their investments 
in the real estate sector.284 
But an SOE’s overseas investment faces less public scrutiny and fewer 
complaints from domestic competitors.  In fact, takeovers of foreign firms 
can bring enormous national pride and serve the purpose of image building 
for the Chinese government.  Moreover, managers of SOEs can use 
overseas investment to demonstrate their skill at managing international 
businesses, and thereby claim political credit for responding to the 
government’s “going out” policy.285  As such, CEOs of central SOEs may 
use their corporate careers as springboards into the national leadership.  
Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese leadership, observes that “[the] younger, 
business-savvy, politically connected and globally minded Chinese CEOs 
 
279 Morck et al., supra note 70, at 344. 
280 HUANG, supra note 275, at 66. 
281 Morck et al., supra note 70, at 344; see also Ligang Song, Jidong Yang & Yongsheng Zhang, 
State-Owned Enterprises’ Outward Investment and the Structural Reform in China, 19 CHINA & 
WORLD ECON. 38, 44 (2011). 
282 Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major 
State-Owned Enterprises), 34 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 27 (2011). 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
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have recently become a new source of the CCP leadership[,]” a 
phenomenon he attributes largely to the meteoric rise and growing power 
and influence of the SOEs. 286 
There is another important reason why managers at Chinese SOEs are 
anxious to grow their companies.  Central SASAC, the supervisory 
commission overseeing the central government’s interests in assets, has 
been gradually reducing the number of SOEs under its control.  When 
SASAC was first established in 2003, it supervised 196 companies.287  This 
number fell to 152 in 2007; 288  it currently only supervises 113 
companies.289  According to SASAC head Li Rongrong, central SASAC 
planned to reduce the number of central firms to well under 100 within the 
next few years, so that only the more efficient firms would survive.290  
According to Barry Naughton, a China expert, “This has touched off a 
furious scramble to expand beyond the cutoff point, since any manager 
who presides over a firm that doesn’t make it into the elite hundred would 
lose his privileged rank and be perceived as a failure.”291 
The agency problems at SOEs are further exacerbated by the lack of 
financial disclosure.  Financial economists have found that public financial 
disclosure can serve as a means to lower the cost of monitoring a firm and 
thus reduce agency problems.292  Empirical studies also show that when 
disclosure quality reduces, managers can make suboptimal decisions such 
as empire building that maximizes their own interest at the expense of the 
firm.293  But the level of financial disclosure varies significantly among 
Chinese SOEs.  Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has 
initiated a process of corporatizing the SOEs and selling their minority 
interests to private investors on both domestic and overseas stock 
exchanges.294   To fulfill the listing requirements, these publicly listed 
Chinese SOEs will need to adopt modern corporate governance structures 
and make mandatory disclosures of their finances.  But the non-listed SOEs 
are not subject to mandatory governance requirements, and very few of 
them have adopted modern corporate governance structure.295  Carved out 
 
286 Li, supra note 282, at 1. 
287 Barry Naughton, SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China, 24 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 
2 (2008). 
288 Id. at 6. 
289 Yangqi Minglu, The List of Central State-Owned Enterprises, SASAC, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/ 
n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). 
290 Naughton, supra note 287, at 2. 
291 Id. 
292 Robert M. Bushman & Abbie J. Smith, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate 
Governance, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237 (2001). 
293 Hope & Thomas, supra note 274, at 592. 
294 OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 261. 
295 For a detailed discussion on the corporate governance issues of Chinese SOEs, see Donald C. 
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of the ministries during early rounds of reform, these SOEs maintain strong 
networks of bureaucrats and officials and shoulder the policy burdens of 
the SOEs.  Many of these companies are loss making296 and have little 
incentive to provide financial disclosures.  As a consequence, there is little 
public information available about the outward investments they make, 
thus providing them with the perfect camouflage for overexpansion.  
Worryingly, this is precisely the reason that many Chinese SOEs prefer to 
use a non-listed SOE (particularly the parent or the sister company of the 
listed SOE) as the vehicle for making overseas acquisitions.297 
Notably, Chinese outward investments are subject to investment 
approvals from various government agencies when they exceed certain 
thresholds.298  However, those bureaucratic approvals are unlikely to serve 
as an effective check on the management decisions of powerful Chinese 
SOEs, particularly those that are directly controlled by the central 
government.  Repeated administrative reforms and industrial overhauls, 
which are part of the broader movement of China’s transition from a 
planned to a market economy, have abolished most of the central 
bureaucracies responsible for the regulated industries and transferred their 
administrative, institutional, and personnel capacity as well as their 
bureaucratic rank to central SOEs.299  Furthermore, many of the large SOEs 
have gone listed and were able to raise funds overseas.  These SOEs 
usually structure their holding companies offshore in tax havens such as the 
Cayman Islands or in Hong Kong and with subsidiaries incorporated in 
China.  The proceeds of the financing they obtain from public securities or 
bond offerings may be held offshores and used for foreign acquisitions, 
thus bypassing the regulations of the Chinese government.300  Using the oil 
and gas sector as an example, the following part investigates the agency 
problems of Chinese NOCs and provides a behavioral explanation of why 
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297 MCGREGOR, supra note 13, at 59. 
298 For a general discussion of the Chinese regulatory regime on outward FDI, see Yadong Luo, 
Qiuzhi Xue & Binjie Han, How Emerging Market Governments Promote Outward FDI: Experience 
from China, 45 J. WORLD BUS. 68 (2010). 
299 See generally DALI YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND 
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B.  A Study of the Chinese Oil and Gas Sectors 
 
Chinese SOEs in the oil and gas industry have been the most active in 
making overseas investment.  According to a study by Deloitte, the oil and 
gas industry has dominated Chinese outbound merger and acquisition 
(M&A) investments, accounting for 28% of the overall market by deal 
volume from 2005 to the third quarter of 2012; they also made up 66% of 
all Chinese outbound M&A investments in terms of value during the same 
period, with a total of U.S. $187.3 billion spent.301  At the same time, 
acquisitions by Chinese NOCs also tend to cause the most alarm in 
Western countries—there is a perennial concern that “China will lock up 
oil supplies and distort international oil markets to the detriment of other 
economies.”302  Many Western observers believe that these Chinese NOCs 
are in “a highly-coordinated quest for oil and natural gas assets,” one 
designed by their political masters in Beijing. 303   This perception is 
reinforced by a number of high profile visits in which Chinese leaders have 
travelled with executives from China’s NOCs to oil-producing states in 
order to sign agreements for energy cooperation with the host countries, 
sometimes in conjunction with other investment, aid, and trade deals.304  
All these facts seem to suggest a coherent story: the Chinese government is 
driving the NOCs’ overseas forays.  “What you see is all there is,” as 
Kahneman says.305 
But appearances can be deceptive and the story is far from complete.  
Undoubtedly, Chinese NOCs are willing and capable of serving the 
economic interests of the Chinese government when doing so is compatible 
with their own interests.  However, they have also shown reluctance to be 
“puppets” of their principal.306  As revealed in the studies of two leading 
experts on Chinese energy security, Erica Downs of the Brookings Institute 
and Bo Kong of Johns Hopkins University, the liberalization of the Chinese 
energy sector over the past two decades has resulted in a shift of power and 
resources away from the central government and toward the NOCs.307  The 
three major NOCs in China, including China National Petroleum 
 
301 DELOITTE CHINA, THE RESURGENT DRAGON—SEARCHING FOR VALUE IN TROUBLED TIME 6 
(2012), available at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Germany/Local%20Assets/Documents/03_ 
CountryServices/2012/CSG_China_Outbound_MuA_Report_2012_EN.PDF. 
302 John Lee, China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil, 35 WASH. Q. 75, 85 (Summer 2012). 
303 Erica S. Downs, The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations, 3 CHINA SEC. 42, 48 
(July 28, 2007). 
304 Id. 
305 KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 85. 
306 BO KONG, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM POLICY 93–94 (David L. Goldwyn et al. eds., 
2010); see also Edward A. Cunningham, China’s Energy Governance, Perception and Reality, MIT 
CTR. FOR INT’L STUD. SER. (March 2007), http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/ Audit_03_07_Cunningham.pdf. 
307 KONG, supra note 306, at 1; Downs, supra note 303, at 49. 
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Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, were all created from 
government ministries in the 1980s. 308   Since the 1990s, repeated 
administrative reforms and industrial overhauls in China’s petroleum sector 
have abolished the central bureaucracies responsible for the petroleum 
industry and transferred their administrative, institutional, and personnel 
capacity as well as their bureaucratic rank to the NOCs.309  The “remaining 
regulatory power over the petroleum industry at the central level continues 
to be fragmented among different bureaucracies,” who often lack the clout 
or staff necessary to regulate the petroleum industry.310  As a result, the 
regulatory agencies often defer to the three NOCs over important policy 
problems and increasingly have relied on them to identify policy problems, 
formulate corresponding responses, and implement policies. 311   Kong 
suggests that this asymmetric distribution of power over petroleum policy 
between the government and the NOCs has resulted in “the latter 
becom[ing] the driver of the country’s domestic and international 
petroleum policy.”312  This is also echoed by Downs’ observation regarding 
the investment decisions made by Chinese NOCs: 
 
Beijing has certainly encouraged China’s NOCs to expand 
internationally, provided them with varying levels of diplomatic 
and financial support, and occasionally intervened in the 
companies’ foreign investment decision-making.  However, 
when it comes to choosing where to invest, the companies are 
almost always in the driver’s seat and the Chinese government, 
while occasionally offering general advice about the direction 
they should travel, . . . is often just along for the ride with little 
idea of the final destination.313 
 
Indeed, when assessing the motives of Chinese NOCs venturing 
abroad, people tend to neglect the principal-agent relationship between the 
Chinese government and the NOCs.  Although the Chinese government 
owns the NOCs, they do not run these companies and, instead, delegate 
their authority to the NOCs.  Conflicts therefore arise when the NOCs 
pursue agendas that advance their own interests at the expense of those of 
the Chinese government.  For instance, many Chinese oil analysts and the 
 
308 Erica Downs, Business Interest Groups in Chinese Politics: The Case of Oil Companies, BROOKINGS 
INST. PRESS 122 (July 29, 2010).  
309 KONG, supra note 306, at 144–45. 
310 Id. at 145.  
311 Id. at 2, 16. 
312 Id. at 144–45. 
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government believe that “equity oil” enhances petroleum security as it 
would give Chinese NOCs additional security in times of market 
turbulence and supply disruption.314  Accordingly, Chinese NOCs have 
been aggressively acquiring upstream assets abroad under the pretext of 
enhancing energy security.  Yet industry experts have pointed out that this 
kind of arrangement is neither politically feasible nor political desirable in 
cases of severe security crisis.315  As producing countries are often reluctant 
to cede residual rights to foreign countries for economic and security 
reasons, China’s foreign upstream investments typically involve limited 
ownership rights.316  Moreover, Chinese “NOCs do not ship all their equity 
oil back home, despite a degree of support from the Chinese 
government.”317  According to China’s customs data, industry intelligence, 
and news reports, “Chinese NOCs shipped back only one-third of their 
overseas equity production and sold the remaining to the international 
market” for profits.318 
So what has motivated these NOCs to make overseas acquisitions, 
since it is not at all clear whether they really enhance national security?  
There are at least two important reasons.  First, the big difference between 
profit margins of the upstream sector and the downstream sector in China 
has motivated NOCs to acquire more upstream assets abroad.  Even though 
the NOCs need to import oil at the international market price, the 
downstream prices are often artificially suppressed by the Chinese 
government.  Due to worries about inflation and its political implications, 
the central government still sets prices for downstream products such as 
diesel and gasoline.319  Consequently, China’s NOCs have lost billions of 
dollars in their refining and marketing sectors in recent years.320  This is a 
particularly serious problem for Sinopec and CNPC because both 
companies have significant downstream business.  As a result, these 
companies have constantly lobbied the Chinese government for subsidies in 
order to compensate their losses.  On several occasions, they even exported 
their products to foreign markets in order to gain higher profits, resulting in 
several rounds of severe artificial fuel shortage in China.321 
 
314 See KONG, supra note 306, at 92 (Equity oil refers to “the proposition of crude production that a 
concession owner has the legal and contractual right to retain or sell as a guarantee on investment under 
the production-sharing agreements.”). 
315 JOSEPH FRANCOIS, WALTRAUT URBAN & FRANZ WIRL, FIW, CHINA’S FOREIGN OIL POLICY: 
GENESIS, DEPLOYMENT AND SELECTED EFFECTS (2010); see also Erica S. Downs, The Chinese Energy 
Security Debate, 177 CHINA Q. 21, 35–36 (2004). 
316 FRANCOIS, URBAN & WIRL, supra note 315, at 52. 
317 KONG, supra note 306, at 93–94. 
318 Id. 
319 Downs, Business Interest, supra note 308, at 130. 
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The other important motivating factor is empire building.  Like other 
SOEs in China, the amount of the high-quality assets of a NOC determines 
its political clout.  As noted by Downs: “The more high-quality assets a 
company acquires, the more likely it is to obtain diplomatic and financial 
support from the Chinese government for its subsequent investments.”322  
This explains the lack of coordination among Chinese NOCs in their race 
for overseas expansion.  Indeed, they have reportedly criticized each 
other’s foreign investments to third parties both inside and outside the 
Chinese government. 323   According to one Chinese consulting firm, 
“CNOOC’s real enemies are China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and 
Sinopec.  The little brother . . . has to have more assets to have a louder 
voice.”324  Indeed, the ultimate holding companies of CNPC and Sinopec 
are both ministry-level companies, whereas the holding company of 
CNOOC has only the lower status of a general bureau.  “Bureaucratic 
ranks,” of course, “are very important in China because negotiations are 
conducted among bureaucracies of equal rank, and only high-rank 
bureaucracies can issue orders to low-rank bureaucracies.”325  As CNOOC 
competes at a political and economic disadvantage with the other two big 
NOCs, it is most pressured to pursue overseas expansion. 
Such agency problems are further exacerbated by lack of disclosure by 
Chinese NOCs.  It has been observed that CNPC and Sinopec have both 
preferred to use the holding company of the listed company to take the lead 
in international mergers and acquisitions.326  Since the Chinese government 
wholly owns the holding company, it is not subject to public disclosure 
requirements, nor is it constrained by public shareholders or independent 
board members from undertaking risky projects.  It is thus no surprise that 
both CNPC and Sinopec have preferred to use these non-listed companies 
to make substantial investments in countries where there are high political 
risks.327  In comparison, CNOOC has only made overseas acquisitions via 
its listed subsidiary.328   But this fact seems to have less to do with 
CNOOC’s incentives to be more transparent than with the restriction 
CNOOC imposed upon itself when it was seeking to get listed in Hong 
 
322 Downs, supra note 303, at 50. 
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Kong in 2001. 329   In order to increase attractiveness to international 
investors, CNOOC entered into a non-compete agreement with its parent 
company, which prohibits the parent company from engaging in the more 
profitable upstream activities.330  As a result, only the listed CNOOC can 
make overseas acquisitions of upstream assets.  In fact, CNOOC has 
attributed its unsuccessful bid for Unocal partly to the delay it encountered 
in garnering support from skeptical independent shareholders. 331   It 
thereafter attempted unsuccessfully to amend the non-compete agreement 
to allow only its parent company to engage in upstream activities.332 
This leads to a puzzle: if the empire-building incentives of SOEs have been 
so well documented in economic literature and there have been abundant 
examples of Chinese SOEs using free cash flow to pursue risky 
investments, why are these agency problems seldom mentioned by the 
Western media or regulators during policy debates?  This Article posits that 
at least three reasons account for such an anomaly.  First, the Western 
public and regulators tend to take mental shortcuts when making judgments 
about Chinese FDI.  They tend to focus on facts that are on screen.  Starting 
from the premise that Chinese SOEs are “owned” by the Chinese 
government, they jump to the conclusion that these SOEs are also 
“controlled” by the Chinese government and, moreover that the communist 
state is lurking behind their operations and management.  At the same time, 
they tend to ignore the facts that are off screen—the principal-agent 
relationship between the Chinese government and the SOEs whereby the 
latter may maximize their own interests at the expense of the former.  
Second, once the public, the media, and regulators form the belief that 
Chinese SOEs are mere puppets of the Chinese government, they tend to 
proactively seek evidence that confirms this belief, while ignoring evidence 
that challenges or discredits it.  Accordingly, studies on the agency 
problems of Chinese SOEs tend to be downplayed or ignored during media 
discussions and policy debates.  Third, well-organized entities including 
private interest groups, the media, and the government can endogenously 
generate fear of Chinese FDI in order to advance their own agendas, thus 
further tipping the policy debate on Chinese FDI to their favor. 
 
329 Id. 
330 See CNOOC Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 21 (Dec. 31, 2012) (“[China National Offshore 
Oil Company] has undertaken to us that we [CNOOC] will enjoy the exclusive right to exercise all of 
[its] commercial and operational rights under PRC laws and regulations relating to the exploration, 
development, production and sales of oil and natural gas in offshore China”.). 
331 See STEINFELD, supra note 192, at 212–15 (Steinfeld explains that the delay in CNOOC’s 
bidding process was largely attributed to its need to comply with the Hong Kong exchange’s listing 
rules, which requires the approval by independent shareholders of the Unocal transaction.  As part of 
the process, CNOOC and its independent directors were required to appoint an independent financial 
advisor to assess the proposed transaction.). 
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VI.  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
This Article catalogues the various heuristics and cognitive biases that 
can influence people’s judgment of FDI.  It finds that people resort to 
various mental shortcuts when thinking about FDI, and that perceptions and 
judgments of Chinese FDI are often guided directly by general impressions 
of Chinese acquisitions and by feelings toward China and not through 
deliberation of the merits of particular proposed transactions.  What the 
Western public and regulators often fail to realize is that they have merely 
turned impressions into beliefs and that what they see on the surface is not 
all there is.  Indeed, when information about Chinese FDI is limited, 
System 1 thinking can operate as a machine for quick conclusions.  
Worryingly, various well-organized entities, such as private interest groups, 
the media, and governments, are all too willing to promote, amplify, and 
exploit such fear. 
This Article thus calls for more effortful thinking about Chinese FDI 
by Western policymakers.  No informed FDI policy can be created without 
a careful risk assessment of the particular FDI transaction.  Before a 
government acts, it must first assess the magnitude of the problem through 
quantitative analysis.  In judging the risks posed by Chinese investment, 
policymakers should be aware that impulsive and intuitive responses can 
often be biased.  As the accuracy of the current official data on FDI is 
likely distorted by a number of factors, it is especially important for 
policymakers in both China and in Western countries to exert efforts to 
improve the statistical tracking of Chinese FDI.  Moreover, rigorous 
empirical research is needed to evaluate the costs and benefits of Chinese 
FDI in Western countries.  How have Chinese companies operated and 
performed in Western economies?  What is their impact on local 
economies?  Have there been any Chinese investments that have posed risk 
to national security?  Without an accurate understanding of Chinese FDI 
investment profiles, motives, and impacts on host countries, undue fears 
about Chinese FDI are likely to be exploited by various interest groups 
seeking regulatory response. 
Second, no understanding of the FDI is complete without a 
comprehensive picture of political and economic dynamics in China.  The 
fact that Chinese SOEs have been most active in making overseas 
acquisitions in fact reflects the institutional characteristics of the distorted 
Chinese economy, which has allocated resources to less efficient but 
politically more powerful SOEs.  Empire building incentives, exacerbated 
by weak corporate governance structures and the lack of financial 
disclosure, have been one of the most important factors in powering the 
overseas expansion of Chinese SOEs. 
Third, investment reviews of Chinese FDI should be conducted by 
experts who understand both FDI and Chinese political economy.  FDI 
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experts are less vulnerable to cognitive biases and social influences as they 
have routine access to accurate sources of information.  Thus they are more 
likely to reach a balanced view regarding the costs and benefits of a 
particular foreign investment.  In the case of the United States, CFIUS, an 
expert agency that specializes in screening Chinese FDI, seems to be the 
most capable of filling this role.  At the same time, Congress’ increased 
interference with FDI review makes it likely that the FDI review process 
will remain susceptible to outside political forces and interest group 
lobbying, as revealed in the CNOOC-Unocal transaction.  The U.S. 
Government should therefore be vigilant against the use of FDI regulations 
as a protectionist tool by various interests groups—groups that often foster 
anti-Chinese sentiment to advance personal agendas.  In the case of Europe, 
the merger unit within the Commission is unlikely to be a suitable 
organization for dealing with FDI review of Chinese SOEs.  While it is 
well equipped with economic and legal experts on merger control 
assessment, its staff may not possess the expertise in Chinese political 
economy necessary for understanding the unique corporate governance 
structure of Chinese SOEs.  As reflected in recent cases involving Chinese 
SOEs’ acquisitions in Europe, the intricate relationship between the CCP 
and the SOEs has presented significant challenges to the Commission 
during its antitrust reviews. 
Fourth, in dealing with Chinese FDI, Western regulators should be 
careful to avoid adopting extreme precautionary measures in response to 
irrational fears, as this precludes a rational assessment of the costs and 
benefits of proposed actions.  Congress’ hostile response to CNOOC’s 
proposed acquisition of Unocal has had severe political and economic 
repercussions.  As the world’s biggest outward foreign investor, the United 
States has an interest to maintain an open foreign investment environment.  
Similarly, the “worst-case scenario” approach that the Commission has 
adopted in reviewing mergers involving Chinese SOEs shows that the 
agency has clearly not thought through potential consequences.  Such an 
approach could jeopardize its jurisdiction on future important antitrust 
cases involving Chinese SOEs.  Moreover, it will tarnish the EU’s hard-
earned reputation as being an open investment environment.  In such 
circumstances, governments could explore alternative and more pragmatic 
approaches and consider whether there are less intrusive measures that 
could best minimize the costs of regulation. 
Fifth, rather than viewing Chinese FDI as a threat, it is important to 
remind ourselves that the increased FDI inflow from China is only part of 
an overall trend of globalization.  In fact, China’s growing integration with 
the world economy should be viewed as a hopeful sign that China 
envisages a peaceful relationship with other parts of the world.  China is 
currently the largest recipient of FDI.  The more China invests in Western 
countries, the more Chinese assets will be subject to foreign regulatory 
control.  This, in turn, could impose constraints on China as unequal 
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treatment of foreign firms operating in China could spark retaliation against 
Chinese firms operating abroad.  This balance of power could thus 
minimize conflicts and frictions between China and other countries. 
Sixth, Chinese FDI presents challenges and opportunities not only to 
Western countries, but to China as well.  Chinese firms that venture 
overseas will need to play the Western game.  This could very well 
pressure Chinese companies to adopt better corporate governance structure 
and to provide greater transparency in operations and management.  It also 
pushes the Chinese government to conduct further reform and restructuring 
of Chinese SOEs.  Indeed, the reform of Chinese SOEs is still a work-in-
progress and the challenges that Chinese companies face abroad are a 
blatant reminder for the Chinese government that more radical political and 
economic reforms are needed for China to achieve a successful transition 
into a true market economy.  It is imperative for Chinese SOEs, whether 
listed or non-listed, to improve their corporate governance structures and to 
provide more public disclosure of their overseas investments. 
Last but not least, this Article casts doubt on the wisdom of Chinese 
SOEs pursuing overseas expansion.  Chinese policymakers will do well to 
remember that market reform carried out in China in the past three decades 
has contributed to its astonishing economic success.  But overseas 
expansion by Chinese SOEs marks a reversal of such a trend.  The defects 
in the institutional structure of the Chinese economy, coupled with the 
weak corporate governance structure of Chinese SOEs and the lack of 
financial disclosure, makes it highly likely that state assets are squandered 
and wasted in overseas acquisitions.  As SOEs are the main players in 
Chinese outward investment, such expansion could lead to unintended 
consequences in the form of further entrenching their position in China—a 
development that would stifle market reform and have far-reaching 
political and economic consequences for the future of China. 
 
